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Does Pepsi compete with Coke? It seems a straightforward question; perhaps
you think it has a straightforward answer. Sure they compete, you might say;
they are both colas, they are used for the same purpose, they are sold next to
each other in the grocery store, and they cost about the same.' In fact, however,
the answer is far from clear. Whether you think Coke competes with Pepsi may
depend on whether you drink one of them. If you do, ask yourself this question:
how big a price increase would it take before you would switch from one to the
other? A penny? Five cents? Ten cents? What if the price doubled? Maybe you
wouldn't switch at any price.2 If you are like a significant number of consumers,
it would take a pretty dramatic change in price to get you to give up your
preferred brand.
For antitrust, this insensitivity to price has a simple-and shocking-
implication: Coke and Pepsi don't compete in the same market. Antitrust
defines markets by asking, in part, whether a small but significant nontransitory
increase in price (or SSNIP) above marginal cost would cause customers to
switch from one good to another. And by small, the regulators mean something
like 5%.3 So if a bottle of Coke costs $1.60, unless a price increase of eight
1. A recent price check showed a six-pack of Coke selling for $4.19 (69.8 cents/can) and a six-pack
of Pepsi selling for $3.99 (66.5 cents/can), a 5.0% price differential. Priced at Draeger's Supermarket,
Los Altos, Cal. (Feb. 25, 2012).
2. If you think this, you're kidding yourself. You wouldn't pay $1 million for a can of Coke, right?
But a slightly modified form of the statement in text-that a particular customer wouldn't switch at any
likely price to an alternative beverage-accurately describes some customers. See infra note 139 and
accompanying text.
3. U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552
(Sept. 10, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 Guidelines].
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cents would send so many consumers running to buy Pepsi that Coke would
lose money, the two don't compete. And while supply substitution can also
constrain market power, that won't work here either; Pepsi-Cola can't (legally)
start making Coke rather than Pepsi just because the price went up. By our
classic antitrust definition, then, Coke and Pepsi are not in the same market.4
And assuming Coke's price change doesn't send customers off to any other
drink either, then Coke is in a market by itself, one in which it has market
power.
Nor is this an isolated result. In market after market, intellectual property
(IP)-based product differentiation and brand loyalty mean that small price
changes have little or no effect on purchasing behavior. Customers who want a
Harry Potter novel won't be satisfied with a somewhat cheaper Stephen King
novel. New York Yankees fans won't accept a Boston Red Sox hat instead of
one supporting their team. And, perhaps most remarkably, brand-loyal drug
customers will happily choose Advil5 even though a substitute guaranteed by
the Food and Drug Adminstration (FDA) to be functionally identical6 is sitting
right next to it on the drugstore shelf at as little as half the price.7 To antitrust
law, all these products have market power in their own, individualized markets.
If we took market definition seriously, antitrust law would look very different
as applied to IP. Monopolists are subject to a variety of constraints that ordinary
competitors don't face. To take just one example, exclusive dealing arrange-
ments are subject to the rule of reason: they are unlawful if they foreclose a
substantial share of the market.8 If any well-known brand has power in its own,
individually defined market, exclusive deals or licenses signed by those brands
would probably be illegal. That result would require a major change in business
practice.
4. But see PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 106-07 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam), where
the court found that fountain-dispensed soft drinks were the relevant market and consequently treated
the two companies as competitors.
5. Jura Liaukonyte, Is Comparative Advertising an Active Ingredient in the Pain Relief Market?
10-11 & tbl.1 (May 9, 2011) (conference paper), available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/workshops/
marketing/archive/pdf/liaukonyte.pdf (showing that brand name Advil had a 16.79% share of the
over-the-counter pain relief (analgesics) market, almost a two-to-one advantage over generic ibuprofen,
which had a 9.28% share).
6. Generic Drugs: Questions and Answers, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Resources
ForYou/Consumers/QuestionsAnswers/ucmlI0100.htm (last updated Aug. 24, 2011) ("A generic drug
is identical-or bioequivalent-to a brand name drug in dosage form, safety, strength, route of
administration, quality, performance characteristics and intended use.").
7. See, e.g., CONSUMER REPORrs HEALTH BEST Buy DRUGS, THE NONSTEROIDAL ANrrI-INFLAMMAoRY
DRUGS: TREATING OSTEOARTHRITIS AND PAIN, COMPARING DRUG EFFECTIVENESS, SAFETY, AND PRICE 12
(2011), available at http://www.consumerreports.org/health/resources/pdf/best-buy-drugs/Nsaids2.pdf
(showing a 40% price difference between a month's supply of Advil 200 mg tablets and the generic
equivalent).
8. See, e.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961) ("[A]n exclusive
dealing arrangement ... does not violate [antitrust law] unless the court believes it probable that
performance of the contract will foreclose competition in a substantial share of the line of commerce
affected.").
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IP law also depends to some extent on market definition. A variety of IP
doctrines also require courts to define markets, though they often do so in a
more ad hoc way than does antitrust. Here too, actual practice seems at odds
with what antitrust's approach to market definition requires. If generic drugs
don't compete with their branded counterparts, then it makes little sense to
award damages in patent cases on the assumption that sales of the infringing
product cause the patentee to lose sales. If the shape of a handbag distinguishes
it from all other handbags and therefore defines a distinct market, that design
should be deemed functional and hence unprotectable under trademark law. And
if counterfeit goods don't substitute for authentic goods in the minds of consum-
ers, the case for awarding the trademark owner lost profits from those counter-
feits seems dubious at best. In short, a world that recognized the market power
apparently conferred by IP rights would impose many more restrictions on IP
owners than our cases do today, as a matter both of antitrust doctrine and IP law.
And, we would be a lot more worried about the anticompetitive effects of IP
rights generally. The IP-antitrust relationship would look a lot more like a
persistent conflict, and antitrust would limit IP rights more than it currently
does.
Perhaps the problem is not with the substantive application of antitrust and IP
law but with market definition. Antitrust market definition has arguably become
too ossified, dependent on assumptions about competition that are static and
presuppose homogeneous products that compete solely on price and quality.
This may be why courts have not been able to figure out how to define markets
appropriately in the many IP settings where market definition is required: they
don't really know what it means for IP products to compete. Led by Louis
Kaplow, a number of scholars have challenged the primacy of traditional market
definition rules as unsuited to a complex world with differentiated products and
heterogeneous preferences. 9 In the 2010 merger guidelines, the United States
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission took a substantial step
away from reliance on formulas to establish market definition and market
power, focusing instead on more direct evidence of competitive effects of
mergers, such as higher prices and reduced innovation. o We think this was a
step in the right direction. Both antitrust and IP need tools for market analysis
that account for the dynamic nature of innovation and the differentiated nature
of IP products. So perhaps courts in IP cases are right when they ignore
antitrust's traditional approach to market definition, even if they haven't been
doing so consciously.
9. Louis Kaplow, Market Share Thresholds: On the Conflation of Empirical Assessments and Legal
Policy Judgments, 7 J. COMPEIION L. & EcON. 243, 252-58 (2011) [hereinafter Kaplow, Market
Share]; Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARv. L. REv. 437, 440 (2010) [hereinafter
Kaplow, Why (Ever)].
10. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSnCE & FED. TRADE COMM'N., HoRizoNTAL MERGER GUIDEUNEs (2010) [hereinaf-
ter 2010 Guidelines], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf
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In fact, we think the answer lies somewhere in between the two extremes.
Antitrust law must recognize that the general point of IP rights is to create some
form of differentiation and, therefore, some (usually constrained) power over
price. Treating any product that does so as a monopoly can be counterproduc-
tive, both because it will put antitrust law into regular conflict with IP policy
and because it may discourage interbrand competition more than it promotes
intrabrand competition. At the same time, both IP and antitrust law are wrong to
ignore the implications of product differentiation and the power it gives IP
owners over customers who strongly prefer one brand or type of product." The
law needs to acknowledge that power in setting IP policies, in awarding
remedies, and in evaluating the competitive effects of IP licensing. And both IP
and antitrust law need to focus less on artificial market boundaries and more on
the actual effects of IP rules and IP owner conduct.
In Part I, we consider the various circumstances in which the IP laws define
markets, implicitly or explicitly, and the assumptions the IP laws make about
market power. In Part II, we discuss the differentiated nature of IP markets from
an antitrust perspective and the surprising ways traditional market definition
would treat those markets. In Part III, we explore the limits of the market
definition principle in both IP and antitrust and offer some initial thoughts as to
how the law might steer a middle ground between finding market power in
every IP case and ignoring the evidence of market segmentation. Specifically,
we argue that courts need to stop conceiving of market power in binary terms
when it is better seen as a question of degree: whether and how much market
power an IP right enables depends on the number and quality of available
substitutes for the products or services covered by the IP right. Moreover, courts
need to recognize that, although consumers' willingness to switch to an alterna-
tive may sometimes be determined by functional similarity, that is often not the
case for goods covered by IP rights. That certain IP rules create greater market
segmentation means that, if excessive product differentiation is a concern, some
doctrines are better suited than others to address that issue. We conclude in Part
IV by identifying the doctrines in IP law that most contribute to market
segmentation and therefore provide the best policy levers to modulate that
segmentation.
I. MARKET DEFINITION IN IP DocTRINE
A wide variety of IP doctrines require courts to engage, explicitly or implic-
itly, in market definition, or at least something that closely resembles it. Courts
11. As we explain below, there has been remarkable cognitive dissonance among courts and scholars
alike on this point. On the one hand, advocates of LP rights emphasize the need for strong rights to
create incentives, which can only be created if the rights in fact effectively enable commercially
valuable differentiation. On the other hand, however, when confronted with the costs of such protection,
many of these same advocates insist that IP rights create no power because functional substitutes are
readily available. See infra section ILB.
20592012]
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
can't, for example, determine whether exclusive use of a product feature puts
competitors at a "significant non-reputation-related disadvantage"l 2 such that
the feature is functional; determine market harm in copyright; or determine the
amount of profit a patentee lost because of an infringement, without engaging in
market definition. Yet, despite the widespread reliance on market definition in
IP, courts have developed no apparent methodology for defining markets.
Indeed, courts frequently don't even acknowledge that they are drawing difficult
lines between markets. This isn't particularly surprising given how little atten-
tion market definition has received in the IP literature. It is, however, a problem.
In this Part, we describe several contexts in which market definition matters
in IP cases. We do not suggest this is an exhaustive list, only that these are
important contexts where market definition is necessary and often outcome-
determinative. And as we describe, courts make these important decisions
entirely by their own intuitions. This is a problem, we argue, that both reflects
dissonance about the costs and benefits of IP protection and enables parties to
act strategically.
A. TRADEMARK
Courts engage in market definition, more or less explicitly, in a wide range of
trademark contexts. The most obvious example is in assessing functionality, so
it is no surprise we are not the first to observe the significance of market
definition there.' 3 But the question of competitive need for access to particular
features arises in a variety of contexts in trademark law, and courts necessarily
engage in something quite similar to market definition in a number of areas not
conventionally thought of in these terms.
1. Functionality
Courts have long been divided over the purpose of the functionality doctrine.
On one view, functionality serves primarily as a means of preserving access to
competitively important features. For these courts, "the effect upon competition
'is really the crux of the matter"' 1 4 in functionality cases; the issue is "not the
right to slavishly copy articles which are not protected by patent or copyright,
but the need to copy those articles, which is more properly termed the right to
compete effectively." 5 Functionality, from this perspective, refers to the utility
of the design of an object, which "is determined in light of 'superiority of
12. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001) (quoting Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995)).
13. See, e.g., Anna F. Kingsbury, Market Definition in Intellectual Property Law: Should Intellectual
Property Courts Use an Antitrust Approach to Market Definition?, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 63,
66-75 (2004).
14. In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1341 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (citation omitted).
15. Id. at 1339 (emphases added).
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design,' and rests upon the foundation 'essential to effective competition."" 6
Because courts cannot determine what is "essential to effective competition"
without understanding the market in which the parties participate, market
definition is necessarily implicated in this view of functionality. Competition
takes place within markets, and one's "need" to use a particular feature depends
on the nature of the market in which it wants to participate.
The Supreme Court appeared to downplay this understanding of functionality
in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.," in which the Court
emphasized the functionality doctrine's role in channeling protection of useful
product features to the patent system' 8 and therefore put much greater emphasis
on expired utility patents as evidence of functionality. 9 The Court made clear
16. Id. at 1340 (citation omitted); see also Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F3d 277,
288 (7th Cir. 1998); Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 255 (5th Cir. 1997) ("The
ultimate inquiry concerning functionality . . . is whether characterizing a feature or configuration as
protected will hinder competition or impinge upon the rights of others to compete effectively in the sale
of goods." (citations and internal quotation omitted)); Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann Prods. Co.,
791 F.2d 423, 425 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986) (explaining that the Morton-Norwich effects-on-competition
inquiry is the appropriate functionality test).
By and large, the Federal Circuit stayed true to Morton-Norwich in the years preceding TrafFix. See,
e.g., Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc. 175 F.3d 1356, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(noting that the Federal Circuit and its predecessor had "repeatedly held that the availability of trade
dress protection does not depend on whether a patent has been obtained for the product or feature in
question" and defining functionality, the sole mechanism for preventing trade dress from having
"anti-competitive effects," in terms of whether a feature "possesse[s] such utility that its protection
would hinder competition" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d
866, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("If the feature asserted to give a product distinctiveness is the best, or at least
one, of a few superior designs for its de facto purpose, it follows that competition is hindered.
Morton-Norwich does not rest on total elimination of competition in the goods."); New England Butt
Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 756 F.2d 874, 879 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (relying on the Morton-Norwich factors
and stating that "Morton-Norwich emphasizes that functionality is to be determined in light of the
competitive necessity to copy"); In re R.M. Smith, Inc., 734 F.2d 1482, 1484 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("[Tlhe
reason the de jure functional rejection exists is, as stated in Morton-Norwich, because '[T]he public
policy involved in this area of the law [is], not the right to slavishly copy articles which are not
protected by patent or copyright, but the need to copy those articles, which is more properly termed the
right to compete effectively."' (second and third alteration in original) (quoting Morton-Norwich, 671
F.2d at 1339)).
But the Federal Circuit did occasionally nod in the direction of a channeling function. See Textron,
Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 753 F.2d 1019, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("The reason for the
functionality limitation, as explained in the seminal Morton-Norwich case, is to protect the fundamental
right to compete through imitation of a competitor's superior product, which right can only be
temporarily denied by the patent or copyright laws.").
17. 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
18. See Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1506-10 (10th Cir.
1995).
19. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29 (holding that an expired utility patent "has vital significance in resolving
the trade dress claim" because a "utility patent is strong evidence that the features therein claimed are
functional"); id. at 29-30 (noting that, where the claimed features are unregistered trade dress, this
"strong evidence" of functionality "adds great weight to the statutory presumption that features are
deemed functional until proved otherwise"). For courts that view functionality as focused on competi-
tive need, expired utility patents are relevant to the question of functionality, but they are only one
factor. See Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1340-41 (noting that the existence of an expired utility patent
which discloses the utilitarian advantage of the design claimed as a trademark is evidence that the
20612012]
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that a design is functional if it "affects the cost or quality of an article," 20
whether or not competitors need to copy that feature to compete effectively. As
a conceptual matter, such a shift in emphasis away from competitive need is
important because not all formerly patented features are, in fact, competitively
necessary.21 Practically speaking, deemphasizing competitive need would re-
duce pressure on the courts to define markets because the functionality determi-
nation could be made without reference to the effect on the market.22 In fact,
however, Traffix has not rendered competitive need irrelevant.
First, some courts have resisted the Supreme Court's view that functionality
is primarily a channeling doctrine and have continued to insist that competitive
need is the "crux" of functionality. In Valu Engineering, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp.,
for example, the Federal Circuit reiterated its view that functionality is con-
cerned with the effect on competition and claimed that the Supreme Court's
decision in Traffix did not change the law of functionality or alter the Morton-
Norwich analysis.2 3 In particular, the Federal Circuit seized on ambiguity in the
Court's definition of a functional feature as one that is "essential to the use or
purpose of the article" or that "affects [the article's] cost or quality,"24 insisting
that the availability of alternative designs remains relevant to the question of
whether a feature is "essential to the use or purpose of the article." 2 5 For the
Federal Circuit, essentiality is relative: features are essential when there are no
design is functional). Morton-Norwich identified three other relevant factors: (1) whether the originator
touts the design's utilitarian advantages through advertising; (2) whether alternative designs are
available; and (3) whether the design results from a comparatively simple or cheap method of
manufacturing the article. Id. at 1341.
20. See TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32 ("'In general terms, a product feature is functional,' and cannot serve
as a trademark, 'if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of
the article." (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)).
21. Cf Am. Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 271-73 (2d Cir. 1959) ("In approaching the
question of whether Schreiber & Goldberg's copying of the Amco machine is actionable, it must be
remembered that the interests and equities of the litigants at bar are not the only ones which must be
considered. Indeed, the underlying principles of our competitive economy and the desirability of
passing on to the American public the advances of technical progress not only are entitled to
consideration, in fact they dominate the picture. .... [Ilmitation is the life blood of competition. It is the
unimpeded availability of substantially equivalent units that permits the normal operation of supply and
demand to yield the fair price society must pay for a given commodity.").
22. Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2174-81
(2004) (arguing that courts make intuitive judgments about markets in functionality cases and often
define them too broadly); cf Thomas F. Cotter, The Procompetitive Interest in Intellectual Property
Law, 48 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 483, 538 (2006) (arguing that the cost of defining markets in
functionality cases is too great and we might be better served by simply eliminating protection for
product configurations altogether).
23. 278 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("We do not understand the Supreme Court's decision in
TrafFix to have altered the Morton-Norwich analysis."); id. ("We find it significant that neither party
argues that TrafFix changed the law of functionality .....
24. Id. at 1275-76 (quoting TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33).
25. Id. at 1276 (emphasis added) ("[W]e do not read the Court's observations in TrafFix as rendering
the availability of alternative designs irrelevant.").
2062 [Vol. 100:2055
MARKET DEFINITION IN ANTITRUST & IP
good alternatives available to competitors.2 6 This view is mistaken, in our view,
because it ignores the fact that the Supreme Court said that features are also
functional when they "affect [the article's] cost or quality," and because the
Court in TrafFix evaluated whether the dual-spring design was "essential"
without considering alternative designs. But if courts are to focus on essentiality
and define that concept by reference to alternatives, then market definition will
frequently be outcome-determinative: whether there are good alternatives de-
pends entirely on how one describes the market in which one is trying to
compete.
Competitive need remains an important part of functionality for a second
reason: in TrafFix the Supreme Court explicitly distinguished aesthetic and
mechanical functionality, emphasizing the channeling function with respect to
the former but not the latter. Where the issue is mechanical functionality, courts
need not consider whether a feature is competitively necessary once it has been
determined that the feature "is essential to the use or purpose of the device or
when it affects the cost or quality of the device."27 In cases of aesthetic
functionality, by contrast, "[i]t is proper to inquire into a significant non-
reputation-related disadvantage." 2 8 Whether there is any distinction to be drawn
between a "significant non-reputation-related disadvantage" and a "competitive
need," under either standard courts must focus more closely on the relationship
between the plaintiff and defendant in some market. Market definition, then,
remains critical in aesthetic functionality cases.29
Sometimes courts explicitly talk about the market as part of the functionality
analysis, though almost never by reference to any methodology. Take, for
example, Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distribution, Inc.3 o In that case, the
plaintiff argued that the color, shape, and size of its flash-frozen ice cream beads
were nonfunctional because Frosty Bites "could still compete in the ice cream
market by producing, e.g., soft-serve ice cream, which would not have many of
the same functional elements as dippin'dots and thus would not infringe upon
DDI's product trade dress."3 ' The court found that argument "unavailing"
because Frosty Bites "d[id] not want to compete in the ice cream business; it
26. This view is hard to square with the Supreme Court's actual decision in TrafFix, which found the
dual-spring design at issue functional despite evidence that alternative designs were readily available at
little additional cost. See Traffix, 532 U.S. at 27-28, 33-34.
27. Id. at 33.
28. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. See Jay Franco & Sons, Inc. v. Franek, 615 F.3d 855, 860-61 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding a round
beach towel functional and acknowledging that, when assessing competitive need for a claimed feature
"[t]he composition of the relevant market matters"). Having acknowledged this, however, the court
declined to define a relevant market, instead simply noting that "the more rudimentary and general the
element-all six-sided shapes rather than an irregular, perforated hexagon; all labels made from tin
rather than a specific tin label; all shades of the color purple rather than a single shade-the more likely
it is that restricting its use will significantly impair competition." Id. at 860.
30. 369 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2004).
31. Id. at 1203 nn.7, 9. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that those features were not aesthetically
functional. Id. at 1203-05. As we discuss infra, courts universally have accepted that competitive need
2012] 2063
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want[ed] to compete in the flash-frozen ice cream business, which is in a
different market from more traditional forms of ice cream."3 2 Perhaps the court
was right in its conclusion-in fact, we share the court's intuition here-but the
point is just that the conclusion was not based on any apparent methodology.
Indeed, the court made no attempt even to explain its conclusion that flash-
frozen ice cream was in a different market than traditional ice cream.
The court in Topps Co., Inc. v. Gerrit J. Verburg Co. 33 similarly rested its
decision on a determination of the relevant market. In that case, the defendant
claimed that the design of Topps's Ring Pop3 4 was aesthetically functional
because a diamond-shaped candy element was necessary to compete with Topps
and there was no way to configure a diamond-shaped candy element without
coming close to the Topps design. As the court recognized, the defendant's
"functionality argument rest[ed] on the contention that the product category at
issue [was] 'diamond engagement shaped lollipops.'" 3  The court, however,
rejected this definition of the market, insisting that courts "define product lines
rather broadly for purposes of determining functionality" and that "[a]n in-
fringer cannot circumvent trade dress protection by asserting a defense of
functionality on the theory that the prior user's design constitutes a narrow
product line, with which the infringer can only compete by copying the prior
user's design elements."3 Hence, the court concluded, "[d]iamond engagement
shaped lollipops do not constitute a distinct product line within the candy
industry."3 7 The relevant product line, according to the court, was lollipops, and
plenty of alternative lollipop designs were available, including one design
actually used by the defendant: a lipstick container with a cylindrically shaped
candy element.38
is the only relevant consideration in aesthetic functionality cases, so the concern about market definition
is particularly pronounced.
32. Id. at 1203 ("[Flunctionality ... is not to be determined within the broad compass of different
but interchangeable products; the doctrine of functionality is intended to preserve competition within
the narrow bounds of each individual product market." (quoting 3 Louis ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK,
CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIEs § 19:7, at 19-79 (rev. 4th ed. supp.
2003))).
33. No. 96-cv-7302, 1996 WL 719381 (S.D.N.Y Dec. 13, 1996).
34. The Ring Pops were described as "comprised of a candy portion in the shape of a solitaire jewel
[with 8 facets], supported by a plastic base portion in the form of a stylized, or 'play,' ring. The Ring
Pop is held by inserting a finger through the ring, and the candy is then licked." Id. at * 1.
35. Id. at *7.
36. Id. at *8.
37. Id.
38. In fact, the court believed there were plenty of available alternatives even if the defendant
needed to make a jewel or diamond-shaped candy element. Id. at *9 ("Verburg's assertion that it could
not come up with alternative designs is unpersuasive. As a matter of common sense and everyday
experience, as well as testimony offered by Topps, there are limitless possible configurations for a jewel
or diamond-shaped candy element, notwithstanding Verburg's statement that he had never seen an
actual diamond fashioned or cut in a configuration other than that employed for these candy prod-
ucts."). But if the court was right that there were plenty of alternative designs of diamond-shaped candy
elements available (and if the court could be taken to mean not just that other shapes were physically
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The Topps court was hardly alone in drawing the relevant market broadly. In
Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co.,39 the Second Circuit
reversed the district court's conclusion on summary judgment that the RIBBON
bicycle rack was functional because the district court had not focused suffi-
ciently on whether the product's particular shape and design was dictated by its
function as a bike rack, rather than simply performing that function." The court
emphasized that "[t]his issue of functionality on remand should be viewed in
terms of bicycle racks generally and not one-piece undulating bicycle racks
specifically."4 1 Similarly, in Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc.4 2 and In re DC
Comics, Inc.4 3 the courts refused to define the relevant markets in terms of the
characters or plot elements of particular comics or shows: the Warner Bros.
court found that the relevant market was toy cars generally, not "Dukes of
Hazzard" toy cars," and the relevant market in DC Comics was one comprised
of toy dolls generally and not Superman, Batman, or Joker dolls.45
Our point here isn't to argue the correctness of the courts' functionality
findings in any of these particular cases. It is simply to point out that, to the
extent these decisions are based on conclusions about competitive need for a
feature, courts must engage in market definition. The more broadly a court
defines the relevant market, the less any particular design appears necessary; the
more narrowly it describes the market, the more granting exclusive rights to
particular design features seems to impose competitive harm. And courts appear
to define markets in these cases entirely by their own intuition. Why is the
relevant market in Brandir the market for bike racks generally and not ribbon-
shaped bike racks, while the market in Dippin' Dots is for flash-frozen ice-
cream dots, not ice cream generally? Why, in Warner Bros., don't "Dukes of
Hazzard" toy cars constitute a discrete market? The opinions in these cases
reveal no methodology, though it is hard to resist the sense that the courts'
conclusions were less about whether exclusive use of the features at issue would
impose a competitive disadvantage in a relevant market than about whether the
possible, but that they were adequate substitutes in the market), then it did not need to define the market
so broadly as lollipops in general.
39. 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
40. Id. at 1148 ("There are numerous alternative bicycle rack constructions. The nature, price, and
utility of these constructions are material issues of fact not suitable for determination by summary
judgment. For example, while it is true that the materials used by Brandir are standard-sized pipes, we
have no way of knowing whether the particular size and weight of the pipes used is the best, the most
economical, or the only available size and weight pipe in the marketplace. We would rather think the
opposite might be the case. So, too, with the dimension of the bends being dictated by a standard
formula corresponding to the pipe size; it could be that there are many standard radii and that the
particular radius of Brandir's RIBBON Rack actually required new tooling." (footnote omitted)).
41. Id.; see also Weber-Stephen Prods. Co., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1659, 1667 (T.T.A.B. 1987)
(defining the relevant market as barbeque grills generally).
42. 724 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1983).
43. 689 F.2d 1042 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
44. 724 F.2d at 330.
45. 689 F.2d at 1044-45.
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courts believed the plaintiffs in those cases were entitled to impose those
costs. 46
Matters are not helped by statements like the one in Topps that "[a]n infringer
cannot circumvent trade dress protection by asserting a defense of functionality
on the theory that the prior user's design constitutes a narrow product line, with
which the infringer can only compete by copying the prior user's design
elements."4 7 In fact, the existence of an aesthetic functionality doctrine attests
to the fact that defendants can sometimes circumvent trade dress protection by
asserting that the prior user's design constitutes a narrow product line. That is
precisely what the defendant did in Dippin'Dots. The real question is when the
features claimed by the plaintiff as trade dress define a relevant market. And
courts haven't offered any satisfactory answer to that question.
2. Genericness
Trademark law's most basic principle is that protection depends on source
indication. To be a trademark, a claimed term must indicate the source of the
goods or services with which it is used. Terms that instead simply name a
category of product or service are deemed "generic," and they can never be
trademarks.4 8 The primary significance of the term to the relevant consuming
public controls,49 but courts have articulated the test of genericness in several
similar ways.
Some courts, including the Supreme Court, have used the genus/species test,
under which generic terms "refe[r] to the genus of which the particular product
is a species."o Others use the who-are-you/what-are-you test, under which a
valid trademark answers the "who" question and a generic term answers the
"what" question.51 This test is related to, if articulated slightly differently than,
a test that finds a term to be generic when its "primary significance ... is to
describe the type of product rather than the producer"5 2
46. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV. 137,
146-56 (2010) (describing courts' attraction to free riding arguments and their willingness to stretch
doctrine to accommodate that instinct); Mark P. McKenna, (Dys)finctionality, 48 Hous. L. REv. 823,
854-58 (2012).
47. Topps Co. v. Gerrit J. Verburg Co., No. 96-cv-7302, 1996 WL 719381 at *8 (S.D.N.Y Dec. 13,
1996).
48. 2 J. THOMAS MCCARHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETrION § 12:1, at 12-5 (4th
ed. 2011) ("Of course, to properly be called an unprotectable 'generic name' in trademark law, the
designation must be the name of the same product or service which it is alleged to identify the source of.").
49. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064 par. 3 (2006) ("The primary significance of the registered mark to the
relevant public rather than purchaser motivation shall be the test for determining whether the registered
mark has become the generic name of goods or services on or in connection with which it has been used.").
50. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (alteration in original) (quoting
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976)); see also Park 'N Fly,
Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985).
51. See, e.g., Rudolph Int'l, Inc. v. Realys, Inc., 482 F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 2007).
52. Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ'ns, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 611 F.2d 296, 304 (9th Cir. 1979)).
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The exclusion of generic terms from protection can be explained in two
different ways, and both policy justifications are frequently noted by courts.
One explanation focuses on the benefits side of the equation, and specifically
the lack of benefit to consumers from protection of a generic term. Generic
terms do not do the job of a trademark because they do not indicate source, and
they therefore do not reduce consumers' search costs or indicate to consumers
anything about quality.5 3 But another explanation offered with similar fre-
quency focuses on the costs of protecting a generic term. Here courts often
analogize protection of a generic term to conferring a monopoly on the claim-
ant.5 4 In this sense, a generic term names a relevant product category, and
giving a particular producer exclusive rights to that term would give that
producer a significant advantage over competitors who would be unable to
signal to consumers that their products competed in that same market. This
latter explanation seems more consistent with the phenomenon of "genericide,"
in which once-valuable trademarks that clearly did (and still do) connote source
to some consumers are nonetheless denied future protection because a substan-
tial majority of the consuming public has come to associate the term not only
with the producer but with the entire class of goods.
Whatever the explanation, one might think that, because the genericness rule
focuses on the extent to which a term names a relevant category or a type of
product, courts would have some methodology for determining the right level of
generality at which to identify the products at issue. In a case, for example,
involving Chocolate Fudge Soda, is the relevant category fudge-flavored so-
das?5 6 Sodas? Beverages?57 Courts have occasionally struggled to determine
the proper methodology for determining the relevant product class, but no
53. See Am. Cyanamid Corp. v. Connaght Labs., Inc., 800 F.2d 306, 308 (2d Cir. 1986) ("Trademark
protection benefits consumers by enabling them to select products on the basis of their origin. This
encourages sellers to create and maintain good will by marketing products of reliable quality that
consumers associate with their mark. Consumers will not benefit, however, if trademark law prevents
competitors from using generic or descriptive terms to inform the public of the nature of their
product.").
54. See, e.g., A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 305 (3d Cir. 1986) ("The genericness
doctrine prevents trademarks from serving as the substitutes for patents, and protects the public right to
copy any non-patented, functional characteristic of a competitor's product."); Abercrombie & Fitch,
537 F.2d at 10 (to protect a generic name would be to "confer a monopoly" on one seller in the sale of
the named product); see also Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism
Conundrum, 28 CARDozo L. REv. 1789, 1819 (2007) ("Modern courts refuse to extend trademark
protection to generic words or terms because they are concerned that doing so would negatively impact
competition.").
55. See, e.g., King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963) (finding
"thermos" to be a generic term for vacuum-insulated containers); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed
Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1936) (finding "cellophane" to be a generic term for transparent
cellulose film); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (finding "aspirin" to be a
generic term for acetyl salicylic acid).
56. See Canfield, 808 F.2d at 308 (finding "chocolate fudge" generic for chocolate-fudge-flavored
diet soda).
57. The Canfield court recognized precisely this difficulty, writing that:
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consensus approach appears to have emerged. One court determined the rel-
evant genus on the basis of assumptions about cross-elasticity of demand,58 a
feature of antitrust doctrine, but courts do not seem to have gravitated generally
to antitrust methodology. Indeed, at least one court has explicitly rejected the
antitrust approach.
More common is the approach in Genessee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing
Co., which seemed to conclude that a product characteristic can itself define a
product class: "If a producer introduces a product that differs from an estab-
lished product class in a particular characteristic, and uses a common descrip-
tive term of that characteristic as the name of the product, then the product
should be considered its own genus."a On this basis the Second Circuit held
that "Honey Brown Ale" was a generic term that described a class of goods:
honey-brown ales. But in doing so it had to draw some pretty fine lines in beer
markets.61
We cannot, however, determine the relevant genus on the basis of abstract analysis, intuition
or common sense alone. Rather, we first examine the principles and tests that Congress and
the courts have developed for judging genericness to determine if any established method is
available for distinguishing product brand from product class. We conclude, however, that
neither of the two dominant principles of genericness, the primary significance test and its
related test of consumer understanding, directly provide an answer to our question, for both
tests become applicable only after we have determined the relevant genus. We therefore must
develop our own rule out of basic principles of trademark law that is consistent with these
tests.
Id. at 299.
58. See Trak Inc. v. Benner Ski KG, 475 F. Supp. 1076, 1079 (D. Mass. 1979) ("We even have
difficulty determining the genus for which defendants claim 'fishscale' is a generic label. Assuming the
genus includes all products for which there is a cross-elasticity of demand, i. e., all types of waxless
cross-country skis, there is no evidence that 'fishscale' has ever been used as a label for that genus, and
it appears unlikely that it would ever come to designate mohair skis as well as plastic base skis."
(citation omitted)). Cross-elasticity of demand refers to the extent to which an increase in the price of
one good will cause consumers to switch to a second good instead. See infra notes 107-08 and
accompanying text. How the Trak court knew that there was only cross-elasticity of demand among all
types of waxiess cross-country skis is a mystery.
59. The Canfield court explained its doubts about relying on cross-elasticities of demand while
noting the power of brands to create their own markets:
In some situations, this [cross-elasticities] test may be unfair to a manufacturer with strong
brand loyalty. Consumers of a particular brand may consider it so superior to others that they
are unwilling to shift to other brands despite a significant change in price. Under the
cross-elasticity test, that brand would become its own product class, and other manufacturers
could use its name. In other circumstances, we imagine that goods with clearly recognized
independent product names might prove to be highly cross-elastic; we suspect, for example,
that the demand for all sodas varies considerably with the price of others. Again, cross-
elasticity would not supply a proper test. Accordingly, we are unwilling to endorse a
cross-elasticity analysis unless and until we are shown a method of applying it suited to the
subtleties of the trademark context.
808 F.2d at 303 n.18.
60. Genessee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 145 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting
Canfield, 808 F.2d at 305-06).
61. For example, the court wrote that:
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The need to identify the relevant consumers is not limited to genericness. To
determine whether a descriptive term has acquired secondary meaning, and
therefore merits trademark protection, a court must likewise determine whether
"the primary significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public is
not the product but the producer." 6 2 Likewise, when courts assess the strength
of a mark they must determine which third-party uses of the same or a similar
mark count as evidence (where third-party uses tend to cut against a finding of
strength). The only uses that count here are those from the "relevant market,"
and courts parse product markets creatively in many cases.' Something quite
similar could be said about descriptive fair use: to the extent the fairness of a
use is driven by an assessment of competitive need to use a term,6 there is
implicitly in this determination a conclusion about the market in which the
defendant is trying to compete. In these cases as well, trademark law is
necessarily defining markets, generally without a clear metric for doing so.
B. PATENT
Market definition plays a role in several patent contexts too because courts
are sometimes called on to determine the extent to which there are alternatives
[Wihen applied to an ale, the mark is generic. There are numerous styles of beer in the
marketplace, the names of which consist of a time-honored beer category modified by a new,
creative ingredient or flavor. Examples include maple porter, pumpkin ale, nut brown ale,
raspberry wheat, cranberry Iambic, and oatmeal stout. In some of these new beer styles, the
innovative ingredient is honey. As a result, there are honey wheats, honey porters, and honey
cream ales on the market. Under the Canfield reasoning, which we have adopted, none of
these names may be trademarked. Someone is always the first to sell these products, and if
that brewer were granted a monopoly on the name, subsequent producers would lose the right
to "describe [their] goods as what they are."
Id. at 148 (alteration in original) (quoting CES Publ'g Corp. v. St. Regis Publ'ns, 531 F.2d 11, 13 (2d
Cir. 1975)).
62. Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938); see also Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives
Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982) ("[Slecondary meaning [is acquired when] ... in the minds
of the public, the primary significance of a product feature ... is to identify the source of the product
rather than the product itself."). Consumers, however, need not be able to name the source of a product
or service; it is sufficient that consumers expect all goods with the same mark to emanate from a single,
if anonymous, source. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining a mark as an indicator that "identiffies]
and distinguish[es] [a party's] goods ... from those manufactured or sold by others" and "indicate[s]
the source of the goods even if that source is unknown"); McCAiRmY, supra note 48, § 3:9.
63. See, e.g., Maker's Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Amer., Inc., No. 10-5508, 2012 WL
1605755 (6th Cir. May 9, 2012) ("We recognize that 'extensive third-party uses of a trademark [may]
substantially weaken the strength of a mark."' (alteration in original) (quoting Homeowners Group, Inc.
v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1108 (6th Cir. 1991))).
64. See id. (upholding the district court's conclusion that third-party use of similar dripping wax
seals on distilled spirits was unconvincing because it concerned seals used on all distilled spirits and the
relevant market was more limited (including tequila and bourbon, but not other distilled spirits)).
65. See Zatarains v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, 698 F2d 786, 793 (5th Cir. 1983) (focusing on
competitors' need to use a claimed term as one factor to consider in determining whether the term is
descriptive or suggestive).
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to the patented invention or the range of relevant prior art.6 6
1. Damages
The most obvious place we see market definition at work in patent law is in
the context of lost profit damages.67 Patent law awards damages "adequate to
compensate for the infringement." 6 8 The traditional measure of those damages
is the patentee's lost profits: the amount of money the patentee would have
made selling the invention had the defendant not infringed. 69 To determine that,
we need to know which other competitors in the market might take the sale
away from the patentee, what noninfringing alternatives might serve as substi-
tutes for the patented good, how the presence of infringement affected the price
the patentee could charge, and how an increase in price absent that infringement
would have affected total demand.o In some circumstances, we may also need
to know how the patented product interacts with other, unpatented comple-
ments7 ' and even how it interacts with unpatented non-complementary products
sold by the patentee.7 2 The analysis of whether a patentee lost profits because of
an infringement is, accordingly, quite sophisticated and requires the estimation
of supply and demand curves and cross-elasticities of demand. As we note in
Part II, these are the classic hallmarks of antitrust market definition and power
analysis.
An important category of patentees who are not entitled to lost profits are
patentees who don't sell their own products in the market for the patented
goods-market definition again. These patentees, like those who cannot prove
lost profits, can fall back instead on a reasonable royalty for the licensing of
their patent. Until recently, the reasonable-royalty analysis was comparatively
66. The patent misuse doctrine treats markets more expressly. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2006)
(defining patent misuse to include illegal tying of unrelated goods to a patent license when the patentee
"has market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale
is conditioned"). Because it is largely (though not completely) consonant with antitrust law, see 1
HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ATrrrRUST § 3.2 (2d ed. 2010 & Supp. 2011), we consider the
treatment of markets in patent misuse cases along with our discussion of antitrust.
67. For discussion of the role of market definition in patent damages, see Marion B. Stewart,
Calculating Economic Damages in Intellectual Property Disputes: The Role ofMarket Definition, 77 J.
PAr. & TRADEMARK OF. Soc'Y 321, 324-30 (1995).
68. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
69. For detailed discussion, see Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable
Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 655 (2009).
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 950-51 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (awarding lost
profits on the sale of unpatented components sold along with the patented invention).
72. See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (awarding lost profits on
the sale of the patentee's unpatented products that competed with the defendant's infringing products).
73. Lemley, supra note 69, at 658. These may include so-called "patent trolls" who don't make any
product at all, but merely assert patents against those who do. They may also include companies who
sell products in one market but seek revenue from their patents in another market in which they do not
sell.
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less sophisticated than the lost-profits analysis.7 But developments in the last
few years have required more careful attention to the question of what a willing
buyer would have agreed to pay to license the patent from a willing licensor."
That question also touches on market definition, albeit less directly than in the
lost profits context. Courts and experts distinguish among prior comparable
licenses in part by asking which are the most relevant to the current patent,
which requires some assessment of competitive proximity. Further, reasonable
royalties, like lost profits, require consideration of available noninfringing
alternatives, which means that courts must identify other technologies that are
sufficiently different from the patent to avoid infringement but still close
enough that they serve as functional substitutes for the patented product in the
minds of actual consumers of that product. 76 Notably, in contrast to the sophisti-
cated market definition process associated with lost profits cases, market defini-
tion in reasonable royalty cases remains rudimentary and largely implicit,
subsumed in the overarching question of what people in "this industry" would
have paid for a license.
2. Nonobviousness
The nonobviousness determination requires courts to ask whether a person
having ordinary skill in the art would have found the claimed invention obvious
in light of the relevant prior art. Making this determination requires a court
first to determine what prior art is relevant so that the invention may be
compared to the proper baseline.7 9 And not all prior art makes the grade. To
determine the relevant prior art, courts ask (in part) something analogous to a
market definition question: what references come from the "same field of
endeavor"?8 0 Answering that question requires us to know how to define the
type of invention at issue (or at least its "field of endeavor") so that we can
determine its obviousness. This isn't market definition per se; two things might
74. Id. at 656.
75. See, e.g., Uniloc USA Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1317-18 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Lucent
Techs. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
76. Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Lemley,
supra note 69, at 658 n.16.
77. For criticism and suggestions for ways to make the reasonable royalty test more rigorous, see
Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating Reasonable Royalties, 14
LEwis & CLARK L. REv. 627 (2010).
78. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.
112-29, § 3(c), 125 Stat. 284, 287 (2011) (replacing the first-to-invent system with a first-to-file
system).
79. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966) ("Under § 103, the scope and content
of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be
ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the
obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined.").
80. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Two separate tests define the scope of
analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem
addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor's endeavor, whether the
reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.").
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be in the same "field of endeavor" even though they don't compete in any
meaningful sense, and vice versa.8 ' And even prior art from outside the field
will sometimes be considered if it is relevant to the particular problem being
solved.8 2 But, because it often requires an assessment of an invention's field of
endeavor, the obviousness determination will, in some cases, entail a determina-
tion that at least resembles market definition.
In the utility patent context, "field of endeavor" generally is defined function-
ally rather than by reference to market alternatives.83 And in this context, unlike
patent damages, a functional approach may be appropriate. The market defini-
tion problem is much more pointed in the design patent context, however,
because the relevant prior art cannot be defined by function there. Design
patents, by definition, do not cover function. Thus, although courts define the
relevant prior art as the art to which a person of ordinary skill would look for
design inspiration, that category is more likely to track a relevant market than is
the "field of endeavor" determination in utility patent law. 84
C. COPYRIGHT
Just as in the trademark and patent contexts, courts in copyright cases
sometimes delineate the boundaries of copyright rights by considering market
conditions. That means that courts sometimes engage in market definition here
as well.
1. Distinguishing Ideas from Expression
It is black-letter copyright law that protection attaches only to expression and
not to the ideas embodied therein. Courts must therefore distinguish ideas
from expression both to determine what the plaintiff in a copyright case actually
owns and to determine whether a particular defendant's work infringes. 86 And
as Judge Learned Hand famously observed, this is a difficult task because
81. Cf In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659-660 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating that the prior art reference was
not in the same field even though it was owned by the same company because the invention related to
petroleum storage and the prior art related to petroleum extraction).
82. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (concluding that laptop designers would look
to prior art of door hinges when designing hinged laptop screen).
83. See In re Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325 (rejecting the contention that the "field of endeavor" test is
unworkable because of the lack of clear guidelines and stating that the "test for analogous art requires
the [examiner] to determine the appropriate field of endeavor by reference to explanations of the
invention's subject matter in the patent application, including the embodiments, function, and structure
of the claimed invention").
84. See, e.g., Hupp. v. Siroflex of Am., Inc., 122 F.3d 1456, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("The scope of the
prior art is not the universe of abstract design and artistic creativity, but designs of the same article of
manufacture or of articles sufficiently similar that a person of ordinary skill would look to such articles
for their designs.").
85. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991).
86. See id.; see also Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 714 (2d Cir. 1992)
(filtering out unprotectable elements of computer program and comparing remaining protectable
elements to defendant's work).
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[u]pon any work ... a great number of patterns of increasing generality will
fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may
perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is about,
and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of
abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the play-
wright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from their
expression, his property is never extended.8
To take a modem example, when Mattel sued the makers of the Bratz line of
dolls, claiming the dolls too closely resembled those depicted in preliminary
sketches to which Mattel owned rights, the Ninth Circuit held that the district
court erred because it failed to filter out the unprotected idea of "fashion dolls
with a bratty look or attitude, or dolls sporting trendy clothing."" For the Ninth
Circuit, without those elements filtered out, Mattel would gain monopoly
control over a certain type of doll.
For our purposes, the important question is why the dolls were appropriately
described at that level of specificity. Implicit in Judge Kozinski's opinion is the
notion that exclusive rights over "fashion dolls with a bratty look or attitude, or
dolls sporting trendy clothing" would have given Mattel power over a signifi-
cant market segment-hence the concern about monopoly. But how does the
Ninth Circuit know that exclusive rights to "fashion dolls with a bratty look or
attitude" would impose significant competitive costs? The conclusion depends
on an implicit judgment about what sorts of things compete in a relevant
market. If nonbratty dolls were a good substitute for bratty dolls, there would be
no reason to worry about giving Mattel protection over the latter, at least from a
competitive standpoint. Put in copyright terms, we might define the idea at a
higher level of abstraction, perhaps as "dolls."
In fact, Mattel is fairly representative in this respect: the idea-expression
dichotomy relies on an implicit market definition and application of that rule
tends to imply fairly narrow markets. In common parlance, we might speak
broadly of markets for "books" or "romance novels," but copyright law parses
the markets much more narrowly, defining markets as something more akin to
the one identified by Judge Learned Hand: stories in which two children of
feuding families fall in love, marry in secret, and meet a tragic end, and which
are designed to appeal to a certain ethnic or religious group.89 Whether copy-
right diverges from antitrust market division in this respect is an issue to which
we turn in Part II.
87. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
88. Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm't, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 916 (9th Cir. 2010).
89. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 119 (distinguishing between two plays about feuding Jewish and Irish
families whose children secretly fall in love, marry, and have children in part because they appeal to
separate markets).
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2. Fair Use and Market Harm
Fair use under section 107 of the Copyright Act is determined by reference to
four factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.90
While the Supreme Court has insisted that consideration of the factors is
highly contextual and that no one factor is dispositive,9 ' empirical work sug-
gests that the fourth factor-the effect on the market for the copyrighted
work-is effectively determinative in most cases.92 Here, in contrast to the
idea-expression dichotomy, courts tend to conceive of the market for a copy-
righted work very broadly-so that not only do courts consider "the extent of
market harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but also
whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the
defendant ... would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential
market for the original."9 Moreover, according to the Supreme Court, the
"enquiry 'must take account not only of harm to the original but also of harm to
the market for derivative works."' 9 4
The inclusion of what are clearly separate derivative markets might seem to
suggest that market definition doesn't really matter in fair use analysis. In fact,
however, how one defines the relevant derivative market in these cases has a
significant effect on the outcome.95 If one believed, for example, that a particu-
lar rap song competed in the market with all other rap songs, and that each rap
song was more or less interchangeable with the others, then a defendant's use of
a particular song might not seem to cause much market harm at all, except in
the circularly-defined market for licensing. If the defendant were required to
90. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
91. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994); Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) ("[T]he statute notes four nonexclusive factors to be
considered.").
92. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U.
PA. L. REv. 549, 582-83 (2008).
93. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. Id. (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568).
95. See generally Sara K. Stadler, Relevant Markets for Copyrighted Works, 34 J. CoP. L. 1059
(2009) (discussing market definition's relevance to, and impact on, copyright law).
96. Cf Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592-93 (conceiving the relevant question as the effect of a parody rap
version of a classic country rock song on the market for nonparody rap derivatives of the song). On the
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pay to use the plaintiff's particular song, there's no compelling reason to believe
it would still choose that song (even assuming that the plaintiff would willingly
license); plenty of other equally good alternatives are available, potentially at
lower costs. If, however, the particular rap song is not readily substitutable,
then, assuming all other factors are equal, uses by third parties are likely to
cause greater harm because uncompensated uses are more likely to take the
place of uses for which the plaintiff would have been paid. Notably, however,
courts' determination of the relevant market tends not to be even this sophisti-
cated; they rarely attempt to parse the market beyond genre, nor do they offer
any reasons to think genres correspond to markets.
D. THE PROBLEM WITH IMPLICIT MARKET DEFINITION
Lack of clarity about market definition in IP cases is to some extent a
consequence of inconsistency in defining the terms of the debate. Courts and
scholars alike sometimes talk about relevant markets in purely functional terms
so that markets are defined by the functional characteristics of the products at
issue. Other times, however, markets are defined by consumer demand, which
may or may not track functional considerations.
This framing choice, however, tends not to be random but instead generally
tracks normative views about the scope of the rights in question. When making
the case for strong rights, advocates emphasize the need for incentives and the
important role IP rights play in enabling creators to appropriate economic value.
They also cite enormous economic losses attributable to infringement, relying
heavily on the assumption that most infringements represent lost sales." This is
reflected in the damages phase of litigation, where the notion that there are
plenty of available substitutes for the product covered by the applicable IP
right-so that access to the particular feature is not particularly valuable-tends
to disappear. Courts in trademark cases are frequently persuaded, for example,
that the defendant chose the mark to free-ride on the unique value of the mark."
In copyright cases, plaintiffs claim that no other copyrighted work would have
been able to satisfy the consumer's needs, so the court can readily assume that
the defendant's use took away from what otherwise would have been a sale by
circularity of licensing markets, see Mark A. Lemley, Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?,
70 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRos., Spring 2007, at 185.
97. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592-93; Micro Star v. FormGen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir.
1998) (assuming that additional levels of play for a video game compete with, rather than complement,
the game itself).
98. We see this even more absurdly in the public statements of content owners and government
advocates of stronger anti-piracy provisions, who (among other serious methodological flaws) quantify
losses attributable to "piracy" by treating every unauthorized use of their work as a lost sale. See, e.g.,
Julian Sanchez, 750,000 Lost Jobs? The Dodgy Digits Behind the War on Piracy, ARS TECHNICA (Oct.
7, 2008, 11:30 PM), http://arstechnica.comltech-policy/news/2008/10/dodgy-digits-behind-the-war-on-
piracy.ars (criticizing those assumptions).
99. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 46 (describing the growing use of the free-riding argu-
ment).
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the plaintiff."' And in patent cases, plaintiffs are happy to draw fine distinctions
between available substitutes in order to claim lost profits.'o' In short, courts
setting remedies define markets narrowly in order to emphasize the harm the
plaintiff claims to have suffered.
Where the issue is concern about the scope of IP rights and their general
effects on competitors or on the ability of others to speak, by contrast, parties
and advocates of broad IP rights define markets broadly so as to downplay the
consequences of IP rights. So, for example, advocates of broad trademark rights
dismiss concerns about the effects of those rights by claiming that trademark
protection has few competitive costs since others can simply choose another
market at little cost.' 0 2 In copyright, concerns about the costs of protection are
brushed aside on the ground that copyright doesn't create any market power
because it allows others to create competing, functionally equivalent works. 10 3
And in patent law, we have seen a consensus develop that patents do not confer
100. See, e.g., United States v. Dove, 585 F. Supp. 2d 865, 869 (W.D. Va. 2008).
101. See, e.g., Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
102. See WLLIAM M. LA.NDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE EcoNoMic STRUCTuRE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 172-73 (2003) ("The number of distinctive yet pronounceable combinations of letters to
form words that will serve as a suitable trademark is very large, implying a high degree of substitutabil-
ity and hence only a slight value in exchange.... At least in the case of a fanciful mark, then, the social
costs of legal protection of trademarks are modest, both absolutely and in relation to the benefits
discussed earlier. Other kinds of mark [sic] involve higher but still manageable costs, and marks that
involve costs in excess of their benefits are denied legal protection."). But see Stephen L. Carter, The
Trouble With Trademark, 99 YALE L. J. 759, 760 (1990) (calling into question "the premise [of the
traditional economic justification for trademark law] that the set of available marks is virtually infinite
and, in consequence, that the actual mark chosen by a firm to represent its goods is irrelevant").
103. See, e.g., Christopher Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.YU. L. REv. 212,
218-19 (2004) [hereinafter Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation] (arguing that the idea-
expression dichotomy, which precludes protection for the underlying ideas of a work and therefore
leaves others free to create "alternative works with the same functional characteristics as any existing
work" effectively "dissipates authors' monopoly power"); id. at 218 n.16 ("There are no barriers
preventing another author from putting pen to paper and attempting to create a substitute for any
written work. In other words, although copyright prohibits others form copying the specific words
penned by J.K. Rowling without her permission, it does nothing to prevent any other person from
writing stories about a school where children learn to perform magic. The inputs needed to create
substitutes for more complex media are generally freely available."); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright
and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 635 (2006); see also Paul
Goldstein, Copyright, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 79, 84 (1992) (arguing that, because "one author's
expression will always be substitutable for another's," copyright will generally not create monopoly
power); Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual
Property, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1727, 1730, 1734 (2000) (arguing that "copyrights do not prevent
competitors from creating works with the same functional characteristics" and therefore "almost all
copyrights ... are not monopolies"); Douglas A. Smith, Collective Administration of Copyright: An
Economic Analysis, 8 REs. L. & EcON. 137, 139 (1986) ("The potential monopoly power for individual
holders of copyright whose works must compete with each other is in most instances not likely to be
substantial.").
The Supreme Court dismissed speech-related concerns with the similar claim that copyright only
limits access to particular words and doesn't prevent one from speaking herself. See Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) ("The First Amendment securely protects the freedom to make-or decline to
make-one's own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people's
speeches.").
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market power-a view that depends on the belief that patented inventions
compete with other products in more or less competitive markets. 04
Perhaps the problem is the lack of clear standards for market definition in IP
cases. If we had clear rules for defining markets, parties couldn't take inconsis-
tent positions when it suited them to do so. We would either define markets
narrowly, treating IP rights as conferring substantial power and lacking substi-
tutes, or we would treat them as just another property right, unlikely to cause
much harm but also unlikely to confer much unique value.
Unlike IP law, antitrust law does exactly that. Antitrust has a long-standing,
well-developed methodology for defining markets. Accordingly, in Part II we
consider antitrust market definition and whether it offers a way to rationalize the
conflicting understandings of market scope and market power in IP cases.
HI. MARKET DEFINITION AND PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION
A. MARKET DEFINITION IN ANTITRUST LAW 105
Antitrust is about market relationships. It is designed to promote competition.
Competition doesn't occur in a vacuum; a company must compete with others
in some market.' 0 6 As a result, the first step in virtually any antitrust case is the
definition of the market in which the competitive harm is alleged. 07 This is true
of mergers and monopolization cases, which generally require some quantum of
market share as an element of the offense-you can't measure market share
without having a market in which to have that share. But it is also true of many
agreements. Mergers, joint ventures, and some agreements among competitors
are harmless in competitive markets but can impose serious competitive threats
in highly concentrated markets. Before those agreements can be characterized
as unlawful, the fact finder must establish either the existence of market power
or the likelihood that the conduct at issue will create such power or facilitate its
exercise. And even in the shrinking set of cases involving conduct antitrust law
treats as illegal per seos-where market power is irrelevant-market definition
is still relevant. In order to know whether an agreement is illegal per se, we
104. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45-46 (2006) (eliminating the
presumption of market power that had been attributed to the tying product in an antitrust case where the
tying product was patented). Illinois Tool Works reflected the clear weight of scholarly opinion. See id.
at 44 ("[T]he vast majority of academic literature recognizes that a patent does not necessarily confer
market power.").
105. Portions of this section are adapted from 1 HovENKAMP Er AL., supra note 66, ch. 4.
106. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECoNOMICS 384 (1890) (explaining that the market is "the
whole of any region in which buyers and sellers are in such free intercourse with one another that the
prices of the same goods tend to equality easily and quickly" (translating AUGUSTIN COURNoT, RE-
SEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMAICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH ch. 4 (1838))).
107. The principles of market definition for antitrust are elaborated on in 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTIRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ch. 5
(3d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2012).
108. For a discussion of the demise of the per se rule, see, for example, Mark A. Lemley &
Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 IowA L. REv. 1207 (2008).
2012]1 2077
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOuRNAL
need to know whether it is an agreement between competitors, which means we
need to determine whether the agreeing parties would have competed absent the
agreement.
Antitrust determines market power circumstantially by defining a relevant
market and then computing the defendant's share of this market. A relevant
market is a collection of goods or services that can profitably be sold at a
monopoly price.' For that to be true, the goods in the collection must be
effective substitutes for one another, and goods outside the group must not be
effective substitutes for goods inside the group. A substitute is effective if it is
desirable enough to customers so that a sufficient number of those customers
will switch to the substitute if the good's price rises somewhat above cost. If
many purchasers will switch, we say that the cross-elasticity of demand be-
tween the two goods is high-a change in the price of one good will affect the
demand for the other good. Goods with high cross-elasticity of demand are
generally thought to compete with each other in the same market. By contrast, if
a modest increase in the price of, say, pencils would not cause many people to
switch from pencils to pens, the price of pens does not effectively constrain the
price of pencils. Cross-elasticity of demand is low, and it doesn't make sense to
consider pens and pencils as competing in the same market because the pres-
ence of pens isn't constraining the price of pencils. A relevant market, then, is
some grouping of sales in which the cross-elasticity of demand between things
inside the grouping and things outside the grouping is relatively low. The same
is true of geographic as well as product-market space. If customers won't drive
more than five miles to get to a grocery store, a grocery store ten miles away is
not an effective substitute for a local store; the two are in separate (geographic)
markets.
Antitrust market definition also considers supply substitution, which occurs
when producers of a somewhat different product are able to shift their produc-
tion into the price increaser's market. Assume for a moment that cars and
minivans could be manufactured using the same technology and distribution
systems, and that a maker of cars can quickly and cheaply switch from the
production of cars to the production of minivans. In this case, even if customers
are unwilling to substitute away from high-priced minivans to cars, producers of
cars will constrain minivan pricing by entering the minivan market, making
more minivans and fewer cars. Similarly, suppose that a United States' maker of
minivans that sells its products locally attempts to increase prices to monopoly
levels. If minivans can be shipped inexpensively and producers in Japan or
Korea are earning competitive returns in those countries, they will respond to
the United States price increase by shipping more minivans into the United
109. See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 867 F.2d 1531, 1537 (8th Cir. 1989) (explaining
that a relevant market is "any grouping of sales whose sellers, if unified by a hypothetical cartel or
merger, could raise prices significantly above the competitive level" (citation omitted)); see also 2B
AREEDA & HovENKAw, supra note 107, 533b.
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States, with the result that United States minivan prices will fall back to the
competitive level. The ease with which suppliers of related goods can move into
the market in response to an increase in price determines the "elasticity of
supply" or "supply substitutability."' 'o
Barriers to entry are a third consideration in defining an antitrust market. A
barrier to entry is something that deters or delays the entry of new rivals even
when the firm or firms in the market are already charging supracompetitive
prices."' Entry analysis helps determine the possibility of supply substitution.
If entry is so easy that new entrants can flood a market any time incumbents
raise prices to supracompetitive levels, the products those incumbents sell
cannot be effectively monopolized or cartelized and it doesn't make sense to
talk about those products as a separate market.112 By contrast, if there is some
structural barrier to entry, such as a high fixed cost of initial investment in a
plant, a strong patent right or a government licensing process that controls entry,
supply substitution from new firms or existing firms making other products is
less likely.
A relevant antitrust market is a grouping of sales for which both the cross-
elasticity of demand and the cross-elasticity of supply with other products are
sufficiently low to warrant the conclusion that a significant price increase of that
grouping to a supracompetitive level would be profitable and relatively durable.
This typically means not merely that the increase will be immediately profit-
able, but that the monopoly price increase will be profitable for a significant
length of time-say, two years.1 3 If the price increase is "transitory"-if the
increase causes new entry that drives prices back down-it does not reflect
market power.
Finally, the size of an antitrust market necessitates a policy judgment about
how large a price increase above the competitive level should be tolerated." 4 If
we regard a price even 1% above the competitive level as intolerable, we would
110. See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 107, 561.
Ill. See JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS To NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES IN
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1956). This definition of entry barriers is controversial. Some economists
define entry barriers as costs that "must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but [are] not
borne by firms already in the industry." See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67
(1968); accord C. C. von Weizsacker, A Welfare Analysis of Barriers to Entry, 11 BELL J. EcON. 399,
400 (1980). For an explanation why this is not the best definition for most antitrust purposes, see 2B
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 107, 1 420c. See also Richard Schmalensee, Sunk Costs and
Antitrust Barriers to Entry, 94 AM. ECON. REv. 471, 472-73 (2004) (arguing that for antitrust purposes
Bainian definition of entry barriers is superior to Stiglerian definition).
112. At least that's the theory. For evidence suggesting that the threat of entry may not discipline
cartel behavior, see Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J. 1527
(2011).
113. 1992 Guidelines, supra note 3, §§ 3.2-3.3, at 41,561. Notably, the 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note
10, § 9, at 28, still require the price increase to be "non-transitory," but they drop any reference to a
period of time.
114. One might think that any amount of market power should be regarded as undesirable; however,
(1) in even moderately product-differentiated markets, a small amount of market power is almost
always present; and (2) the cost of enforcing antitrust law is high and its outcomes imperfect. An
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respond with a set of rules that defined markets very narrowly because a 1%
price increase might not prompt much supply or demand substitutability. In a
wide variety of product-differentiated markets, individual firms can profitably
charge more than 1% above their marginal costs, and under such a rule we
would conclude that each such firm is a "monopolist." By contrast, if we regard
prices 50% above cost as tolerable, the methodology produces a significantly
broader market definition. Antitrust market definition generally includes in the
same market firms that, while not 'perfect competitors, are able to hold one
another's prices to within five or ten percent above the competitive price."' 5 The
federal merger guidelines refer to this test as a "small but significant nontransi-
tory increase in price," or SSNIP. If a SSNIP is profitable because the price
increase more than compensates the producer for any lost sales, the substitutes
are not effective and the product whose price is increased defines a separate
market.
B. THE ROLE OF IP RIGHTS IN DEFINING MARKETS
It is an article of faith in antitrust law that particular companies do not define
a relevant market because for most users different brands compete with one
another. For example, antitrust might suppose customers are almost indifferent
between Chiquita and Del Monte bananas because most believe that there are
no significant differences in quality, taste, or other attributes. Antitrust is likely
to define a market as "bananas," not "Chiquita bananas." But even when
products clearly vary in quality-for example, cars, or laptop computers-the
basic assumption in antitrust law is that the products produced by individual
companies compete in a larger market of (mostly) like goods. In the rare cases,
like Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,l 16 when antitrust has
departed from that assumption, the outcry has been fierce.'" 7 To an antitrust
lawyer, brands aren't markets; the regulatory agencies may view a collection of
premium or mid-tier brands as a relevant market but seldom a single brand." 8
aggressive market definition rule requiring only a very small price increase would produce a great deal
of expensive antitrust litigation with unacceptably high rates of error.
115. The 1992 and 2010 Merger Guidelines use 5% as the default level but define that price from
current levels rather than the competitive level. See 1992 Guidelines, supra note 3, § 1.11, at
41,551-55; 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 10, § 4.1.2, at 10. That creates its own set of problems, which
we discuss infra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
116. 504 U.S. 451 (1992). In that case, the Supreme Court held that parts and service for already-
installed Kodak copiers defined separate markets because parts for other copiers were not effective
substitutes. The Court assumed that the copiers themselves competed with other brands, but once the
customer had purchased a copier, the parts for repairing that copier did not.
117. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis after Kodak, 3 Sup.
CT. EcON. REv. 43 (1993); David McGowan, Between Logic and Experience: Error Costs and United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1185 (2005); David McGowan, Networks and
Intention in Antitrust and Intellectual Property, 24 J. CoRP. L. 485 (1999); Carl Shapiro, Aftermarkets
and Consumer Welfare: Making Sense of Kodak, 63 AirrRUST L.J. 483 (1995).
118. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 117.
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However, the situation is more complex than that. Antitrust market definition
hearkens back to the days of readily interchangeable commodities, like grain or
plywood. Buyers might (or might not) distinguish between different qualities of
grain or plywood, but they are unlikely to pay substantially more for grain
merely because it comes from Zachy's Farms rather than Acme Plants. Products
and brands today, however, often are far more significantly differentiated.' 9 For
while trademarks may telegraph information about product quality or seller
reputation,12 0 they often do much more.12 1 Neuroscience research shows that
brands convey emotional content as well as information about product character-
istics, and that people react to their favorite brands in ways that mirror their
reaction to religious icons.12 2 This is why, despite the fact that people tend to
prefer Pepsi over Coke in blind taste tests, those exposed to the brand names
during the test tend to prefer Coke: exposure to the Coca-Cola brand stimulates
a region of the brain not stimulated in blind taste tests. 1 23 When preferences
created by that information or those attachments are substantial and rivals
cannot readily attain the same status, then it is simply wrong to say that the
brand does not constitute its own relevant market.12 4 Demand is not price-
elastic between the two. And the trademark itself prevents supply substitution.
The effects of product differentiation on antitrust market definition are easiest
to see. Although we might first think of "cars" as defining a relevant market, in
fact there are significant differences between a Mini Cooper, a Suburban, and a
Tesla. People in the market for one kind of car may not be satisfied with
119. Among previous discussions, see, for example, Deven R. Desai & Spencer Waller, Brands,
Competition, and the Law, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1425; Jared Kagan, Bricks, Mortar and Google:
Defining the Relevant Antitrust Market for Internet-Based Companies, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 271, 278
(2011); Steven Semeraro, Property's End: Why Competition Policy Should Limit the Right of Publicity,
43 CONN. L. REv. 753 (2011); Andrew C. Hruska, Note, A Broad Market Approach to Antitrust Product
Market Definition in Innovative Industries, 102 YALE L.J. 305 (1992).
120. See, e.g., LANDEs & POSNER, supra note 102, at 167-68; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley,
Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 Hous. L. REv. 777, 799 (2004); Nicholas S.
Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523, 525-27 (1988) (discussing the
economic benefits of marks that apprise consumers of products' unobservable features); Nicholas S.
Economides, Trademarks, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONoMICs AND THE LAW 602 (Peter
Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter Economides, Trademarks] (describing the savings for consumers in
product searches as one of "[tihe primary reasons for the existence and protection of trademarks");
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & EcoN.
265, 268-70 (1987) (identifying the lowering of brand recognition costs to consumers as the justifica-
tion for trademark law).
121. See Desai & Waller, supra note 119.
122. See MARIN LmsTRoM, BUYOLOGY. TRUTH AND LIEs ABoUT WHY WE BUY 123-26 (2008).
Indeed, Katya Assaf has gone so far as to suggest that brands are religions. Katya Assaf, Brand
Fetishism, 43 CONN. L. REv. 83 (2010); Katya Assaf, Magical Thinking in Trademark Law, 37 LAw &
Soc. INQUIRY (forthcoming 2012). We wouldn't go that far, but the studies showing how people react to
brands are persuasive.
123. LINDsTROM, supra note 122, at 26-27. The results of the underlying study were reported in
Samuel M. McClure et al., Neural Correlates of Behavioral Preference for Culturally Familiar Drinks,
44 NEURON 379 (2004).
124. See Desai & Waller, supra note 119.
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another, and price variations reflect that fact. That doesn't mean that any one of
those cars is necessarily in a market by itself, but that antitrust law requires us
to investigate customer interests in more detail before defining the relevant
market (perhaps it's "high-end sports cars" or "electric cars" or "convertibles").
IP rights contribute significantly to that product differentiation, and hence
make it more likely that two products that we think of in the same broad class
are not in fact effective substitutes for each other from an antitrust perspective.
By definition, IP rights attach to things that are differentiated from their putative
competitors. We can copyright our novel precisely because it differs from J.K.
Rowling's novel. We can patent our invention only if it is different in a
nonobvious way from products invented by others. Further, the existence of IP
rights means that the things that differentiate my product from yours cannot be
copied. Put another way, an IP right is a barrier to entry that prevents the sort of
quick and easy supply substitution that might undermine market power.
This IP-induced product differentiation can sometimes have the effect of
excluding other goods in the same functional category from an antitrust-defined
market, despite our intuition that the goods must compete. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that three different pain pills-Bayer Aspirin, Tylenol, and Advil-all
sell for 10 cents per pill. Though the three pills perform many similar functions
and are considered roughly interchangeable for certain pains, they are also quite
different and have different side effects. Acetaminophen, a generic version of
Tylenol, then enters the market at a price of 3 cents per pill. In response, the
price of branded Tylenol drops to 4 cents, while the prices of branded Bayer
Aspirin and Advil show no effect. On these facts, Bayer Aspirin and Advil do
not compete with Tylenol in a traditionally-defined antitrust market.125 If they
did, their higher price would cause so many customers to switch to the now-
lower-priced Tylenol that they would have been forced to lower their own prices
in response. 126
In fact, however, the effect of IP rights on market definition is even more
dramatic. Tylenol and Advil are brand names for acetaminophen and ibuprofen,
respectively. But neither is the subject of a current patent. So anyone is free to
copy the chemical formula of those drugs exactly and to produce an acetamino-
phen or ibuprofen product that competes with Tylenol or Advil. And they do.
Curiously, however, those generic alternatives sell at a significant discount
compared to the price of brand-name Tylenol or Advil, often as much as 50%
125. In the Ciprofloxacin case, the court concluded that the market was properly limited to
Ciproflaxacin because the price of the branded version of that product dropped 95% when the generic
version entered. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 521-23
(E.D.N.Y. 2005). This indicated that the preentry price of Ciprofloxacin was significantly above cost
and that existing alternative drugs had not been able to discipline that price.
126. For a discussion of the very interesting question of why all three products were priced at 10
cents before entry if they are not in fact competitors, see infra note 148.
[Vol. 100:20552082
MARKET DEFINITION IN ANTITRUST & IP
less.12 7 It is the brand name that makes the difference. Even though generic
companies can and do advertise that they have the same ingredients as Tylenol
or Advil, and even though they are often placed next to each other on pharmacy
shelves, the brand name is sufficient to cause many consumers to pay a higher
price- for the same basic good. 12 8 Interestingly, the same is true even for
prescription drugs, for which the decision maker is generally a doctor.' 2 9
These brand-driven price differences have an interesting antitrust conse-
quence: just as Advil and aspirin might not compete with each other in a
relevant antitrust market, Advil and generic ibuprofen might not compete with
each other on traditional antitrust analysis. Indeed, a number of courts have held
that brand name drugs and their generic equivalents are in separate markets for
antitrust purposes. For example, in Geneva Pharmaceuticals Technology Corp.
v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., the Second Circuit concluded that a pioneer branded
drug and its chemically identical generic substitutes were not in the same
relevant product market because so many consumers chose the drug on the basis
of its name that a significant price difference persisted between the generic and
branded versions.130 In that case, the generic had been introduced at a price of
70% of the price of the branded drug, but subsequently the price of the generic
fell to 50% of the branded drug price. 1 3 1 It might seem odd to say that two
127. See Simon P. Anderson et al., Push-Me Pull-You: Comparative Advertising in the OTC
Analgesics Industry 16 tbl.1 (Apr. 27, 2012), http://ssm.com/abstract=2 047106 (comparing pricing
"per serving"). On the same dynamic in prescription drugs, see Andrew T. Ching, Consumer Learning
And Heterogeneity: Dynamics of Demand for Prescription Drugs After Patent Expiration, 28 brr'L
J. INDUS. ORG. 619, 621 fig.1 (2010) (showing that, on average, generic prices gradually drop from
about 60% of brand price to 50% as their market share rises to about 60%).
128. Indeed, consumers may even take the lower price as a signal that the generic pills are less
effective. See DAN ARIELY, PREDICrABLY IRRATIONAL 83-84 (2008).
129. Judith K. Hellerstein, The Importance of the Physician in the Generic Versus Trade Name
Prescription Decision, 29 RAND J. EcON. 108 (1998) (describing the role of physicians in the decision
to use brand name drugs or generic substitutes and the tendency of certain physicians to prescribe one
or the other, a tendency not explained by patient characteristics). Indeed, prescribing habits may be
resistant even to information regarding drugs' serious risks. Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting Medical
Judgment? False Assumptions in the Pursuit of False Claims Regarding Off-Label Prescribing, 9 MINN
J.L. Sci. & TECH. 61, 79 (2008) ("[W]hile changes in drug labeling regarding warnings of previously
unknown, serious risks are often mailed or faxed directly to physicians, studies indicate that these
mailings do not result in changes in prescribing practice-that physicians frequently prescribed drugs in
violation of warnings, including black box warnings." (citing Jerry H. Gurwitz, Serious Adverse Drug
Effects-Seeing the Trees Through the Forest, 354 NEw. ENG. J. MED. 1413, 1414 (2006))).
130. 386 F.3d 485, 497-98 (2d Cir. 2004); cf Bayer Schera Pharma v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 08-civ-
03710, 2010 WL 1222012, at *4-*6 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 29, 2009) (rejecting market definition based on
dosage of a pharmaceutical's active ingredient and cautioning against amending complaint to define the
market as a single brand); In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D.D.C.
2006). In Lorazepem, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's
conclusion that the relevant market consisted only of generic manufacturers of a drug. First, many fact
witnesses from the industry testified that they did not "consider the brand price in setting their own
prices." 467 F. Supp. 2d at 82. Second, "both Plaintiffs' experts and industry participants viewed
generics as competing in a different market than the branded manufacturers." Id. Third, the court cited
testimony by a plaintiffs' expert that branded and generic drugs have different customer bases and are
marketed differently. Id.
131. The court noted that branded
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functionally identical products are in separate markets. But that is because
markets aren't always about function; consumers' beliefs about products can
drive purchasing behavior even if those beliefs are not based in reality.
The implications aren't limited to pharmaceuticals. IP rights can create their
own antitrust market in any product in which consumer loyalty to the brand is
strong enough, or in which IP rights make the products different enough. We see
brand-based price differentiation among goods of undifferentiated quality in a
wide variety of consumer markets. Some brands of gasoline, such as Shell,
systematically charge more than their competitors, even when those competitors
are across the street. Others, like Arco, charge less. 13 2 Consumers willingly pay
substantially more for Clorox-brand bleach than for generic bleach, 3 3 even
Coumadin's substantially higher prices is evidence of a distinct customer group with brand
allegiance and/or high risk sensitivity that was unwilling to switch from the known brand
name even in the face of a discounted alternative. That this group ias remained loyal despite
Coumadin's conspicuously higher prices strongly suggests inelastic demand.
Geneva, 386 F.3d at 496-97.
We also conclude that Coumadin's customers are displaying strongly inelastic demand.
Overall generic penetration has not been as significant in the warfarin market as in other drug
markets of comparable size: Barr's CEO testified that generic penetration after one year can
be as high as 60 percent, but Barr projected only 35 percent penetration after a year and in fact
captured just 8 percent of the warfarin market. Three-and-a-half years after generic warfarin
was introduced, the generic substitution rate was just over 30 percent despite prices that were
40 percent lower than Coumadin. Such results indicate a substantial customer base that has
not responded to lower prices.
Customers that have remained with Coumadin clearly do not perceive generics to be a
reasonable substitute for it. Conversely, price-sensitive customers have flocked to the cheaper
generic and are likely to view another inexpensive generic as a reasonable substitute.
Plaintiffs' evidence suggests that upon generic entry, the consumer base split such that
Coumadin and generics each faced smaller, distinct consumer groups.
Id. at 497-98.
For discussion of this issue, see, for example, Anish Vaishnav, Note, Product Market Definition in
Pharmaceutical Antitrust Cases: Evaluating Cross-Price Elasticity of Demand, 2011 Cotum. Bus. L.
REv. 586.
132. See Christi Shafer, Big Gasoline Brands Continue to Lose US Retail Market Share, O. DAILY,
Apr. 20, 2012 (noting that in a recent quarter Arco offered an average discount of 11.1 cents per gallon
compared to competitors); see also Jennifer R. Thompson, Brand Loyalty and Gasoline Pricing in
Sacramento, 10 AGRIc. & RESOURCE EcoN. UPDATE 9, 9-11 (2007), available at http://giannini.ucop.edu/
media/are-update/files/articles/vlOn6_3.pdf (documenting daily retail gasoline price differences of up to
18.2 cents per gallon between stations and attributing the effect to brand differentiation). This is
particularly notable because, as Thompson observes, the brand of gasoline sold at a branded retail outlet
may not even have been refined by the brand-name company. Id. Although consumers may believe one
brand of gasoline is somehow superior to another, perhaps based on advertising that suggests a
particular brand boosts performance, that belief is not rooted in reality. One might quibble whether it is
the brand name or the advertising campaign that is causing the artificial product differentiation here,
though certainly the brand name is the focus for advertising misinformation.
133. Clorox has a 65% market share. DATAMONrrOR, REF. No. 0072-0013, INDusTRY PROFILE: BLEACH
IN THE UNITED STATEs 2 (Nov. 2011). In 2011, "customers continued to buy products despite" a 12%
increase in pricing for Clorox liquid bleach. Clorox Says Higher Prices Helped Lift Revenue, REurERs,
Nov. 2, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/03/business/clorox-says-higher-prices-helped-
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though the essence of bleach is a simple chemical formula. 3 4 Tazo brand
organic green mint iced tea and HonestT brand organic green iced tea sell right
next to each other in grocery stores for a 30% difference in price per ounce.'
Fans of the Three Tenors might not accept songs by others as a substitute.' 36
And sports fans won't be willing to replace a hat with their team's logo with a
hat from a competing sports franchise.' 3 1 Under traditional antitrust market
definition, each of these things are in a separate market. Indeed, some goods
(called Veblen or snob goods) invert the traditional price relationship so that
demand actually increases rather than decreases with price. Veblen goods,
therefore, exhibit a sort of anti-network effect; acquisition of the good by new
lift-revenue.html; cf FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) (requiring divestiture of
bleach company before approving merger because of concentration in the bleach market).
134. True, like gasoline sellers, bleach companies often include additives in their products, which
they point to as differentiating factors. "The basic raw materials for making household bleach are
chlorine, caustic soda, and water. However, most modem bleach products contain a variety of
ingredients such as surfactants; solvents: agents for adjusting pH and/or viscosity; colorants; oxidizing
agents; corrosion inhibitors and fragrances raw materials." DATAmONrlOR, supra note 133, at 16. But
there is little evidence that some bleaches are in fact better than others as a result of these additives.
Indeed, this strikes us as a nice example of meaningless differentiation. See, e.g., Jim Wang, Four Ways
to Save Money Without Noticing It (Sept. 21, 2010), http:/ money.usnews.com/money/blogs/my-money/
2010/09/21/four-ways-to-save-money-without-noticing ("For products like bleach, it doesn't matter if
you buy the generic or Clorox (which is just bleach with a fancy label).").
135. Observation made October 11, 2011, Munger Store, Stanford, California.
136. Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 37-38 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (treating Three Tenors
albums as existing in their own market).
137. Justice Breyer made this very point about relevant markets in the oral argument for the
American Needle case. The issue in that case was whether the NFL should be regarded as a single entity
for purposes of licensing merchandise, or whether each of the thirty-two individual teams acted
independently in that capacity. During the oral argument, Justice Breyer inquired about the possibility
of competition between merchandise of different teams (as opposed to competition between different
providers of merchandise of the same team), leading to the following exchange:
JUSTICE BREYER: You want the Red Sox to compete in selling T-shirts with the Yankees; is
that right?
MR. NAGER: The ability to compete. Yes.
JUSTICE BREYER: Yes. Okay. I don't know a Red Sox fan who would take a Yankees
sweatshirt if you gave it away.
(Laughter.)
JUSTICE BREYER: I mean, I don't know where you're going to get your expert from that is
going to say there is competition-
MR. NAGER: Well-
JUSTICE BREYRE [sic]:-between those two products. I think they would rather-they
would rather wear a baseball, a football, a hockey shirt.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010)
(No. 08-661), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument_transcripts/08-
661.pdf. For discussion of the market definition problem in sports leagues, see Daniel A. Schwartz,
Note, Shutting the Back Door: Using American Needle to Cure the Problem of Improper Market
Definition, 110 MICH. L. REv. 295 (2011).
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consumers actually reduces the value of the good to existing owners.'3 A
Veblen good (say, a Rolex watch) may not compete with other watches in a
classic sense or even with counterfeit Rolexes because the price the consumer
pays for the Rolex is itself part of the value of the product they are buying.
Brands clearly create significant differentiation in the minds of consumers,
whether that belief is based on functional differences in the goods being sold.
Survey evidence suggests that, across all products, a significant number of
consumers would be willing to pay a substantial premium for their brand of
choice. According to one study, 72% of consumers would pay a 20% premium
over the price of the closest competitive brand; 50% would pay a 25% pre-
mium; 40% would pay a 30% premium; and 25% say "price does not matter"
when it comes to purchasing a brand to which they are loyal.139 Leaving aside
those in the last category, who surely don't mean it, those numbers are not
themselves sufficient to justify an across-the-board price increase. The fact that
a minority of consumers would switch away from their favorite brand means
that a 20% price increase would not be profitable because the loss of 28% of the
brand's customers would more than outweigh the benefit. But under antitrust
law, a 20% price increase isn't the test; if virtually all customers had enough
brand loyalty that they would pay 5% more, the brand is in a market of its
own. 14 0 And the self-confessed goal of marketing is precisely to build such
insensitivity to price.
Further, these data come from a generalized survey referring to brands
without identifying specific products. If the average brand generates such
loyalty it shouldn't be too surprising that more famous brands inspire still more
loyalty. Cola drinkers are notoriously loyal to their brands, notwithstanding the
fact that they seem unable to distinguish among different colas in blind taste
tests.141 And brand loyalty is even stronger (and price less of a constraint) with
luxury goods; the customer who pays $740 for a Coach purse may well be
138. See Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis, Seventeen Famous Economists Weigh in on
Copyright: The Role of Theory, Empirics, and Network Effects, 18 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 435, 449-52
(2005) (modeling Veblen goods as a form of negative network effect).
139. Scorr M. DAVIS, BRAND ASSET MANAGEMENT. DRIVING PROFITABLE GROWTH THROUGH YOUR
BRANDS 5 (2002) ("72 percent of customers say they will pay a 20 percent premium for their brand of
choice, relative to the closest competitive brand. 50 percent of customers will pay a 25 percent
premium. 40 percent of customers will pay up to a 30 percent premium. 25 percent of customers state
the price does not matter if they are buying a brand that owns their loyalty.").
140. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
141. See Sanjoy Dhose & Oded Lowengart, Taste Tests: Impacts of Consumer Perceptions and
Preferences on Brand Positioning Strategies, 10 J. TARGETING, MEASUREMENT, & ANALYSIS FOR MARKET-
ING 26, 30 (2001) (showing that, while people tend to prefer Diet Pepsi over Diet Coke in blind taste
tests, those who are exposed to the brand names during the test tend to prefer Diet Coke). Remarkably,
this is not simply because the respondents want to like Diet Coke better-they actually do like the Diet
Coke better when they know it is Diet Coke. Brain scans reveal that the brands stimulate a different
region in the brain that is not stimulated in blind taste tests-the region responsible for higher thinking.
See LINDSTROM, supra note 122, at 26. The results of the underlying study are presented in McClure et
al., supra note 123, at 379.
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unwilling to change to a less prestigious brand just to save $37. 142 Indeed,
studies suggest that demand for some luxury goods actually rises with price, so
demand would decrease rather than increase at lower prices. Wine drinkers act
much the same way, paying ten times as much for one bottle as another despite
being unable to taste the difference.14 3 This may be because of brand loyalty or
simply because the price of wine actually dominates consumers' experiences-
they value drinking an expensive bottle of wine.'4 In either case, demand for a
product is not determined by its functional characteristics. 14 5
Cross-elasticity of demand is a fact-specific question. The evidence doesn't
support the conclusion that all brands confer market power, as antitrust law
once wrongly assumed.14 6 But it seems quite likely that, for many of the most
famous brands and for a variety of goods in which price is a mixed or even
affirmatively positive signal of value, trademark owners can easily raise the
price of their goods 5-10% over the cost of an alternative product without their
customers deserting them for that product. For those brands, other products of
similar type are not in the same market as antitrust defines that term.'4 7
This phenomenon is not limited to trademarks. A wide variety of copyrighted
works also command significant willingness to pay. If you want to read the final
book in the Harry Potter series, you are unlikely to be satisfied by the latest
Stephen King novel. And, indeed, people line up in advance to get access to the
newest Harry Potter novel, iPhone, or movie, while ignoring a variety of other
creative products of the same type available with no wait and frequently at the
142. Indeed, the existence of counterfeit Coach products that sell for far less than the genuine article,
see, e.g., Tresa Baldas, Purse Pirates Told to Get a Brand New Bag, DEmorr FREE PRESs, Apr. 17, 2011,
at Al, suggests that even near-identity of marks may not be sufficient to constrain Coach's price. The
question of whether counterfeit goods should "count" in market definition is a thorny one for antitrust
law, and we don't explore it further here. For a full discussion, see 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 66,
§ 4.3c.
143. See, e.g., Robin Goldstein et al., Do More Expensive Wines Taste Better? Evidence from a
Large Sample of Blind Tastings, 3 J. WINE EcoN. 1 (2008) (finding that nonexpert wine drinkers can't
tell the difference between cheap and expensive bottles of wine in blind tastings).
144. Id. at 1 ("[I]ndividuals who are unaware of the price do not derive more enjoyment from more
expensive wine."); Hilke Plassmann et al., Marketing Actions Can Modulate Neural Representations of
Experienced Pleasantness, 105 PROC. OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF Scl., 1050, 1050-54 (2008) (finding that
subjects appreciated wine more when they believed it sold for $90 a bottle than when they tasted the
same wine and believed it cost only $10 and explaining that "changes in the price of a product can
influence neural computations associated with" experienced pleasantness).
145. In one remarkable study, changing the price at which an energy drink was purchased was
shown to influence the ability to solve puzzles. See Baba Shiv et al., Placebo Effects of Marketing
Actions: Consumers May Get What They Paid For, 42 J. MARKETING REs. 383 (2005) (finding that
subjects who bought energy drinks at a discounted price completed fewer puzzles on average than
subjects who purchased the drink at the regular price); see also Rebecca L. Waber et al., Research
Letter, Commercial Features of Placebo and Therapeutic Efficacy, 299 JAMA 1016-17 (2008) (finding
that subjects who consume a sugar pill that they believe is a painkiller can tolerate more pain if the pill
is described as an expensive drug than when it is presented as an inexpensive drug).
146. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45-46 (2006) (overruling prior legal
presumption that an IP right conferred market power over a tying product).
147. For detailed discussion, see Desai & Waller, supra note 119, at 1468-76; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMoRY L.J. 367 (1999).
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same or a similar price. It may be hard to quantify the power over price in a
case like that, but it's surely there.14 8 Indeed, Paul Heald finds that books in
copyright are more expensive than similarly-situated books whose copyright has
expired, suggesting that product differentiation among books provides at least
some power over price.14 9
Whether a copyrighted work or group of works constitutes a relevant product
market for antitrust purposes depends on the consumer response to price
increases, not simply whether there are other works in the same genre. The
copyrighted works of a particular musical artist are not a relevant product
market so long as enough consumers, in response to a supracompetitive price,
would instead purchase the works of other artists that the price increase would
be unprofitable.150 But if consumers wouldn't switch in response to a modest
increase in price, the works are not in the same market. s5
Patents have a similar effect. Many product patents do little more than create
relatively minor enhancements in a product that make it distinctive to one group
of customers, and competitors in that product are likely to have their own
offsetting patented enhancements. As a result, the markets for automobiles,
vacuum cleaners, cleansers, and pharmaceuticals are characterized by numerous
patents, most of which suffice to make their products somewhat distinctive in a
product differentiated market. For antitrust law, the question is how distinctive
those products are. If a small price increase won't dislodge purchasers who
want a hybrid gasoline-electric engine in their car, hybrid cars aren't even in the
same market as nonhybrid cars with the same brand name.
148. Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial Organization Approach to Copyright Law, 46 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 33, 45 (2004); Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, supra note 103. Yoo suggests
that product differentiation doesn't confer market power because entry by products closer in space can
constrain price while giving users choice. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, supra note 103,
at 248-49. But in fact, experience with IP cases suggests that entry often doesn't discipline price.
Brand-name drugs remain significantly more expensive than their generic equivalents, and the presence
of one luxury brand doesn't bring down the price of a different luxury brand. And the broader IP rights
are, the more entry is constrained.
149. Paul J. Heald, Property Rights and the Efficient Exploitation of Copyrighted Works:
An Empirical Analysis of Public Domain and Copyrighted Fiction Bestsellers, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1031,
1034 (2008).
150. See Rock River Commc'ns, Inc. v. Universal Music Grp., Inc., No. 08-cv-635, 2011 WL
1598916, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2011) (finding that Bob Marley albums do not constitute a relevant
product market unto themselves). But see Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 37 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (treating Three Tenors albums as a discrete market).
151. What limited evidence there is suggests that the move from uniform to (frequently higher)
variable iTunes pricing reduced the number of sales. Neil Hughes, iTunes Price Increases Mean Slower
Sales for Music Labels, APPLEINSIDER (Feb. 9, 2010, 11:25 AM), http://www.appleinsider.com/articles/10/
02/09/itunes-price increasesmeanslower_sales formusiclabels.html. This suggests that the compos-
ite demand curve for music is downward-sloping (which is not surprising; most demand curves are
downward-sloping). But if the move was profitable, it also suggests that, at the very least, there are
three different categories of songs (the $0.69, $0.99, and $1.29 buckets) that don't compete on price.
See iTuNFs, http://www.apple.com/itunes/?cid=OAS-US-DOMAINS-itunes.com (last visited July 2,
2012) (offering songs for download at three different prices).
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Further, the SSNIP test is subject to a well-known problem called the
"Cellophane Trap," named after the case that fell into it.15 2 Defining markets by
cross-elasticity of demand requires a reference price: If I raise my price by 5%
from some base level, will people switch to a competing good? The problem is
that a firm that actually does have monopoly power still faces constraints on its
ability to charge whatever price it wants; those constraints are set by consum-
ers' willingness to pay. If a monopolist already charges the profit-maximizing
price, an increase above that price will cause enough consumers to stop buying
the product to make that price increase unprofitable; that's why the lower price
was already profit-maximizing. So we can't just use the price a company
already charges as the base level, or we will conclude that even monopolists
lack market power.15 3 That's what happened in Cellophane: the Court con-
cluded that cellophane must not be in a market by itself because at some price
consumers would stop buying it and use something else instead. In fact,
however, cellophane didn't have good substitutes; the patentee had simply
raised the price of cellophane as high as it could go without spurring defec-
tion.154
Antitrust solves this problem by using some measure of average cost,' 55 not
the actual market price, as the baseline for the SSNIP test.' 56 But that means
that the relevant question is not whether consumers would pay more for a can of
Coke or a Harry Potter novel than they currently do; it is whether they would
pay 5% more for the can of Coke than it costs to make, deliver, and sell it. We
would need manufacturing cost data to resolve that question conclusively, but it
seems extremely likely that most copyrighted works and quite a few trade-
marked ones sell for more than 5% over the cost of making them. Thus, the
evidence suggests that many goods-even those that appear price-constrained
by an alternative-may simply be engaged in price-maximizing behavior up to
the constraint of a different product that is not in fact in the same market.' 7
152. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
153. George W. Stocking & Willard F. Muller, The Cellophane Case and the New Competition, 45
AM. ECON. REv. 29, 54 (1955) (first identifying the problem).
154. See id. at 63.
155. "Cost" is a disputed term in a number of antitrust contexts, particularly predatory pricing. Most
economists agree that marginal cost-the cost to make the next unit of a good-is the right measure of
cost. But it is essentially impossible to measure in practice. Average variable cost is an imperfect
substitute, but it doesn't allocate the fixed costs necessary to develop the product. Average total cost
does include those fixed costs, but they will not always be relevant to the purchasing decision. Finally,
many economists would include an ordinary return on capital as part of fixed costs, while others would
treat it as a profit. For an introduction to these issues, see 3A AREEDA & HovENKAMP, supra note 107,
11735-41.
156. At least, antitrust does so when it can. In fact, however, the Merger Guidelines indicate that
antitrust authorities will often fall back on actual prices, not measures of cost, in calculating the SSNIP.
2010 GUIDELINEs, supra note 10, § 4.1.2, at 10.
157. This may help explain another seeming paradox-the fact that goods that by survey measures
have significant power over price are nonetheless often priced the same as other products of similar
type. While perfect competition is one explanation for equal pricing, Cellophane-style constrained-market-
power pricing is equally possible.
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Even absent such evidence, the strong value of brand loyalty across all
products provides significant incentives for price discrimination among IP
owners. Where IP owners have ways to segment the market between high-value
and low-value users by differentiating their products, they often do so. Booksell-
ers charge more money for books when they are first released in hardback than
they do later when the book is reprinted in paperback. Apparel manufacturers
charge more in some venues than others and discount the price of their clothes
and handbags over time as the supply of high-value early adopters is depleted.
Movie theaters charge more to patrons who come in the evening than to those
who show up for matinees and more to those who watch the same movie in 3D
than to those who don't. And sellers of software, particularly online, charge
different prices to different groups.' 8 Price discrimination of this sort affects
cross-elasticity of demand because the supplier can identify and isolate the
subset of customers who have a low cross-elasticity and charge them higher
prices, while maintaining a lower price for the set of customers who might be
expected to switch. If there were a way to charge the 72% of customers who
would pay 20% more a higher price than the 28% who wouldn't, such a price
increase would surely be profitable. And so-at least for that set of customers-
the copyrighted or trademarked good is not likely to be put in the same market
as alternative products of the same type. Companies that don't have market
power in the traditional sense, but who can price discriminate, may nonetheless
have power over a subset of their customers.
There are other possible explanations for equal pricing as well. First, prices are often sticky, because
people put prices in mental buckets. Raising the price from $0.99 to $1.03 is likely to have a much
more significant effect on consumer behavior than a similar increase that doesn't take the price out of
the "less than $1" category. See, e.g., Gregory Passewitz, Consumer Psychology Towards Price 2
(2003), http://srdc.msstate.edu/trainings/presentations-archive/2003/2003-bst passewitz.pdf (identify-
ing $1.00 as a "major barrier" in consumer purchasing decisions). Second, pricing is costly. Consumers
may in fact value every book in a bookstore at a different aggregate level, but determining that level
might not be worth it for each book. Even if it is, a third problem is that too many prices, like too much
choice in other contexts, can overwhelm consumers and deter them from buying anything. See, e.g.,
BARRY ScHwAIG2, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE Is LESS (2004). Finally, consumers view pricing
at least in part as a moral rather than a merely economic act. They will affirmatively resist a price they
consider "unfair" or "discriminatory" even if they value the product enough to justify paying the price.
Adidas and the New Zealand All Blacks rugby team found this out when they tried, quite reasonably, to
charge more for All Blacks's jerseys in New Zealand than it did in other countries. The resulting outcry
cost them both sales and fan loyalty in New Zealand, even though from an economic perspective it
should have been entirely unsurprising that New Zealanders valued the jersey more than others. See
Jonathan Hutchison, The Price of a Jersey Sets Rugby Fans Against Adidas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2011,
at B3.
For all of these reasons, price differentiation may be smoothed out at the retail level. For example, a
retailer will often have an incentive to sell Coke and Pepsi for the same price even if the wholesale cost
is greater for one than the other.
158. For discussion of price discrimination in IP, see, for example, Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and
the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1799 (2000); Jerry A. Hausman & Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, Price
Discrimination and Patent Policy, 19 RAND J. EcON. 253 (1988); Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law
and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55 (2001).
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In short, the evidence does not support the conclusion that IP rights automati-
cally confer market power. But it does suggest that a surprisingly large number
of IP rights do in fact give their owners power over price. Under traditional
antitrust principles, those products are not in the same market as the goods that
would seem to be their closest competitors.
C. IMPLICATIONS OF MARKET DEFINITION IN IP CASES
It is difficult to overstate just how shocking this conclusion ought to be to
antitrust lawyers. It is not simply that economists and law professors have been
arguing for years that IP rights don't confer market power, 59 deriding the
contrary view as "monopoly phobia."o60 Nor is it that it was only six years ago
the Supreme Court finally overruled decades of Supreme Court precedent
saying that IP rights did confer market power. 16 1 For even when the law
nominally recognized the possibility that IP rights conferred market power,
antitrust law never really acted as if it believed they did.
Consider the implications of concluding that Coke (or Harry Potter books or
Shell gasoline or Clorox bleach or brand-name pharmaceuticals) really is in an
antitrust market by itself. Antitrust law draws sharp distinctions between unilat-
eral conduct, agreements with competitors, and agreements with noncompeti-
tors. Agreements between horizontal competitors to create cartels that restrict
price or competition get the harshest condemnation; they are illegal per se.16 2
159. See, e.g., PHur AREEDA & Louis KAPLOw, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 441 (1988) (suggesting that
80-90% of all patents may be without any commercial value, much less any market power); 1
HovENKAMP Er AL., supra note 66, ch. 4; HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAW § 8.3, at 219 (1985) ("Many patents confer absolutely no market power on their owners .... The
economic case for 'presuming' sufficient market power . .. is very weak."); F.M. SCHERER, THE Eco-
NOMic EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY PArENT LICENSING 44-47 (N.Y.U. GRAD. SCH. Bus. ADMIN. MONOGRAPH
SERIES IN FIN. & EcoN. No. 1977-2, 1977) (explaining that the lack of commercial value of most patents
negates the utility of compulsory licensing); Salem M. Katsh et al., Panel Discussion at ABA National
Institute on Industrial and Intellectual Property, The Value of Patents and Other Legally Protected
Commercial Rights, in 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 535, 547 (1985) (according to F.M. Scherer, "[s]tatistical
studies suggest that the vast majority of all patents confer very little monopoly power."); William
Montgomery, Note, The Presumption of Economic Power for Patented and Copyrighted Products in
Tying Arrangements, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1140, 1156 (1985) ("More often than not, however, a patent or
copyright provides little, if any, market power."). Strictly speaking, the economists were right: IP rights
don't necessarily confer market power. But it is all too easy to leap from that conclusion to the idea that
IP rights don't confer market power. As we have seen, sometimes they do-more frequently than we
like to admit and probably more often when we're dealing with litigation-worthy IP rights. For an early
recognition of the problem we discuss here, see Ariel Katz, Making Sense of Nonsense: Intellectual
Property, Antitrust, and Market Power, 49 ARiz. L. REv. 837 (2007).
160. Beverly W. Pattishall, Trademarks and the Monopoly Phobia, 50 MICH. L. REV. 967, 967-68
(1952).
161. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45-46 (2006) (eliminating the presumption
of market power that had been attributed to the tying product in an antitrust case where the tying
product was patented). Illinois Tool Works reflected the overwhelming weight of scholarly opinion on
the question. See id. at 44 ("[T]he vast majority of academic literature recognizes that a patent does not
necessarily confer market power."). This view has not always been universal, however. See, e.g., Frank
J. Hogan, Patent Monopoly, I GEO. L.J. 23 (1912).
162. 4A AREEDA & HovENKAMP, supra note 107, 1980.
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Agreements between parties in a buyer-seller relationship (vertical agreements)
are treated much more leniently.' 6 3 And agreements between companies that are
not in a competitive relationship at all generally get no antitrust scrutiny.
Unilateral conduct is not condemned at all unless the actor is a monopolist. If it
is, a number of otherwise legal acts become antitrust problems if they have the
purpose or effect of acquiring or maintaining market power.' 6
A world in which individual books and individual brands define their own
markets and, hence, confer market power turns that world upside down. To
oversimplify, if IP rights define their own markets, everyone is monopolizing
and no one is cartelizing. On the one hand, a number of accepted business
practices become illegal if the firm that engages in them has market power. For
instance, exclusive dealing arrangements in which a party agrees to sell to or
buy from only one party, are subject to antitrust's rule of reason. They are illegal
if entered into by firms with market power and if they foreclose a "substantial
share" of the market.16 5 But if the market is defined not as "novels" or even
"fantasy novels" but "Harry Potter books," J.K. Rowling entered into an illegal
exclusive dealing arrangement when she allowed only Scholastic to produce
and sell her books. So did New Zealand's All Blacks rugby team when they
exclusively licensed Adidas to make their jerseys, and so does Coke each time it
signs an exclusive distributorship deal. Grants of exclusive franchise territories
by McDonald's look like a market allocation scheme if we don't think Burger
King competes in the same market. And so on. Antitrust spent the last thirty-five
years undoing its rules restricting vertical restraints,16 6 in large part on the
theory that it was worth sacrificing "intrabrand competition" among dealers or
franchisees in the service of promoting more "interbrand competition." 6 7 But if
interbrand competition doesn't work-if the brands aren't really competing in
the same market at all-the last forty years of antitrust history have been a
colossal mistake.
Concluding that many IP rights define markets turns a wide array of compa-
nies into monopolists, and so in many ways it would dramatically expand the
role of antitrust law. But in other respects, it would shrink it. Suppose Pepsi and
Coke were to enter into a horizontal market division agreement in which Pepsi
agreed to sell only north of the Mason-Dixon Line and Coke agreed to sell only
south of that line. If Pepsi and Coke compete in the same product market, that
163. Nominally, vertical agreements are subject to the rule of reason, but in practice they are
virtually always held legal. See, e.g., Reeves & Stucke, supra note 112, at 1549; Schwartz, supra note
137 (applying the rule of reason to sports leagues).
164. See generally 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 66, ch. 10.
165. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961).
166. Reeves & Stucke, supra note 112, at 1549-50.
167. See, e.g., Cont'l TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-55 (1977) (concluding that
interbrand competition between television sets was more important than intrabrand competition because
the court assumed that "televisions" were a holistic market); Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints
and Competitive Harm: The First Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 487,
488-49 (2011).
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agreement would be illegal per se, just as it would be if they both agreed on the
price they would charge.t "s But if they aren't competitors, traditional antitrust
analysis doesn't have much to say about agreements they enter into, any more
than it would object to Coke's agreeing with the two of us on the price it might
charge.169 Similarly, if (as some courts have concluded) brand name drugs are
not in the same market as their generic equivalents because the branded drugs
command different prices than the generics, an agreement to fix the prices of the
branded and generic drugs, or to pay the generic drug company to leave the
market, would not seem to be an antitrust problem."o And companies that make
one of only two drugs for a particular disease could acquire the other, avoiding
competition concerns by arguing that the drugs are differentiated and are
prescribed by different doctors in different circumstances.' 7 '
168. See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49-50 (1990) (per curiam) (finding "unlawful on
its face" a territory-allocation and revenue-sharing agreement between two bar-review companies).
169. It is true that product differentiation does make cartelization harder, see Christopher R. Leslie,
Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REv. 515, 579 n.453 (2004), but it surely doesn't make it
categorically impossible.
170. To be sure, some courts have (wrongly) reached the conclusion that paying a generic to leave
the market is per se legal. See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 E3d 1323
(Fed. Cir. 2008); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212 (2d Cir. 2006). But those
decisions have been roundly criticized by the vast majority of scholars in the field. See ROBIN FELDMAN,
THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAw 167 (2009); 1 HovENKAMP ET AL., supra note 66, § 15.3(C); Roger D. Blair
& Thomas F. Cotter, Are Settlements of Patent Disputes Illegal Per Se?, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 491,
534-39 (2002); Jeremy Bulow, The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents, 4 INNOvArION POLY & EcON.
145 (2004); Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for Presumptive
Illegality, 108 MIcH. L. REV. 37, 37-41 (2009); Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent
Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L. REv. 747 (2002); Joshua
P. Davis, Applying Litigation Economics to Patent Settlements: Why Reverse Payments Should Be Per
Se Illegal, 41 RuTGERs L.J. 255, 257-58 (2010); Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, How Strong Are Weak
Patents, 98 AM. ECON. REv. 1347, 1347 (2008); C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical
Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1553, 1557 (2006); Herbert
Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REv. 1719,
1721-22, 1751-63 (2003); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. EcON. PERSP.
75 (2005); David W. Opderbeck, Rational Antitrust Policy and Reverse Payment Settlements in
Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation, 98 GEo. L.J. 1303 (2010); Maureen A. O'Rourke & Joseph E
Brodley, An Incentives Approach to Patent Settlements: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis &
Lemley, 87 MINN. L. REv. 1767, 1781-82 (2003); Rudolph J.R. Peritz, Three Statutory Regimes at
Impasse: Reverse Payments in "Pay-for-Delay" Settlement Agreements between Brand-Name and
Generic Drug Companies, in MORE COMMON GROUND FOR INTERNATIONAL COMPEITTION LAw? (Josef
Drexl et al. eds., 2011); Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Pharmaceutical Reverse Payment Settlements:
Presumptions, Procedural Burdens, and Covenants Not to Sue Generic Drug Manufacturers, 26 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 141, 142 (2009); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent
Settlements, 34 RAND J. EcON. 391, 392 (2003). And, in any event, the decisions are based on the idea
that the brand owner held patent rights that gave it the power to prevent generic competition. If the
companies aren't competitors, even a drug company that held no patents at all could lawfully pay a
generic to stay out of the (different) market for generic versions of the drug.
171. See FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 650 F3d 1236, 1239 (8th Cir. 2011) (upholding that finding by the
trial court); cf Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape Comm'n, 655 F3d 1337, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (holding that plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege that Sweet Scarlet variety table grapes were in a
separate market from Autumn King table grapes).
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In still other markets the effects may be more ambiguous. In sports leagues,
the effect of brand-specific market definition may point in the opposite direc-
tion. If an entire sports league is treated as a single entity, it cannot be held
liable for conspiring with itself. But if individual teams are separate actors, their
agreement to league rules implicates section I of the Sherman Act. That is what
the Court held in American Needle.17 2 But if the teams are not only separate
actors, but also ones that don't compete with each other in a market for
merchandise at all, those agreements presumably aren't horizontal restraints on
trade. Similarly, antitrust analysis of the Google book search settlement has
proceeded on the assumption that "books" (or maybe "out-of-print books")
constitute the relevant market.173 But if each of the ten million books is its own
market, Google presumably isn't creating a horizontal aggregation, though it
might face heightened concerns about monopoly, particularly over out-of-print
books for which other sources are not available.
In short, if we live in a world in which IP rights regularly confer market
power, antitrust law has been doing pretty much everything wrong-finding
illegal practices we shouldn't care about and ignoring things that should be
quite troubling.17 4 But before we reach that startling conclusion, perhaps it's
worth revisiting the concept of market definition itself. For maybe the problem
is less that courts have drawn all the wrong conclusions in antitrust cases and
more that their market definition tool is broken. We turn to that possibility in
Part III.
III. RETHINKING MARKET DEFINITION IN ANTITRUST
A. IS ANTITRUST MISCALCULATING MARKETS IN IP CASES?
One possible explanation for the phenomenon we identified in Part H is that
IP markets are different than other goods markets in a way traditional antitrust
market definition fails to consider. Market power is a firm's ability to profit by
raising price above the competitive level, with the competitive level generally
172. Schwartz, supra note 137, at 314-15.
173. See Author's Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 682-83 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Full
disclosure: one of the authors (Lemley) represents Google in this matter.
174. For instance, as Herb Hovenkamp points out, the fact that pharmaceutical companies are
willing to pay generics hundreds of millions of dollars not to sell their products seems pretty powerful
evidence that the companies think generic sales will have an effect on their market. Herbert Hoven-
kamp, Response, Markets in IP & Antitrust, 100 Geo. L.J. 2133 (2012). And although pharmaceutical
patent owners don't necessarily drop their prices when generics enter (indeed, the prices may increase),
they clearly lose substantial sales to those generics. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman,
Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REv. 1455, 1474-81 (2002). So
branded and generic drugs are at least imperfect substitutes: some people are willing to switch from one
to the other. But others aren't, allowing brand owners to keep prices high for the subset of consumers
who are brand-loyal. The SSNIP test misses this complication because it treats consumers as essentially
homogenous. As we discuss in the next Part, that is a mistake.
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defined as marginal cost."' But with IP, the most significant costs are often
fixed and fully "sunk" at the time the intellectual property right is developed.
The cost to invent a new device or make a new movie doesn't change with the
number of copies of the product or movie the creator has produced, and that
cost must be paid whether the creator produces anything at all. The marginal
cost of selling the invention or creative work is limited to the cost of educating
individual buyers and negotiating license agreements, plus whatever it costs to
make each incremental version of the product or copy of the work. These costs
are often, but not always, quite small in comparison to the costs of initial
development.
To illustrate, consider this copyright example. Titanic is a very successful
movie. Making Titanic cost roughly $200 million,"' money that must be
recovered if the investment in Titanic is to be profitable. However, once made,
the movie can presumably be duplicated onto a DVD for a cost of something
like $2.00 per copy or downloaded over the Internet for significantly less than
that. The only incremental or marginal cost of making a copy is the $2.00 or the
cost of the server space and bandwidth necessary to stream or download it. But
Titanic sells in video stores for $15.00-$20.00 per copy. To an antitrust lawyer,
this suggests that its owner has very high market power, giving it the ability to
charge a price nearly eight times marginal cost."'
Perhaps, as some have suggested, marginal cost is the wrong measure of
market power in IP cases."' At a price of $2.00 per DVD, Titanic might have
lost money, and a firm that had contemplated such a price would never have
made Titanic in the first place.17 9 A price that merely covers marginal cost in
this situation would be insufficient to maintain investment in the market for
making movies. To justify being in the movie business, the moviemaker must be
compensated not only for the marginal cost of placing a copy of the movie on a
DVD but also for the much greater cost of producing and promoting the movie
in the first place. So maybe total cost including initial investment, not marginal
cost, should be the measure of market power.
Indeed, one might go further. Even if one knew that the revenues from a
particular movie exceeded its costs over the movie's marketable lifetime, it
would not be clear that the owner of its rights had significant monopoly power
175. Marginal cost is the accepted test for competitive pricing. See 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra
note 107, 739. Because it is hard to measure, however, courts often use proxies like average variable
cost or "incremental" cost. See, e.g., Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 223 (1993).
176. See Box Office/Business For Titanic, INTERNET MovIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/title/
tt0120338/business (estimating the cost of producing Titanic at $200 million) (last visited Mar. 10,
2012).
177. See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 66, ch. 4 (from which this example is taken).
178. Id.
179. While Titanic earned enough money at the box office to become profitable, other movies don't.
Because studios don't know ex ante which film will be the next Titanic, they must make some estimate
of earnings in deciding how much to invest in making a movie.
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across a range of movies. Moviemaking is a high risk enterprise in which many
movies lose money. In order to be profitable in any given year, a movie
production company must have profits that exceed losses, and one profitable
film may do no more than compensate for two others that lose money. The same
thing is true of pharmaceuticals, where most estimates of the cost of drug
development include not just the cost of developing the drug that is ultimately
sold but also the costs of all the R&D projects at the company that didn't pan
out.180 This is even true of trademarks. For example, Ford may market three
sedans at a given time-the Fairlane, the Mercury Park Lane, and the Edsel.
The Fairlane may make good profits in a particular period while the Mercury
returns only marginal profits and the Edsel loses money. Overall, Ford may be a
merely profitable firm, not one with supracompetitive profits, if we take into
account the failures as well as the successes. On this view, IP rights viewed in
context might not confer supracompetitive returns to the company as a whole
even though they regularly support prices well in excess of marginal cost for a
specific product.
Nonetheless, we don't think market power in IP cases can be dismissed this
easily for three reasons. First, and most critically, allocating fixed costs to
IP-protected products seems to confuse market definition and market power
analysis with the policy desirability of allowing companies to recoup those
costs. If two products that consumers find equally attractive have the same price
and the same marginal cost, it makes no sense to conclude that they are not in
the same market merely because Company A spent more money developing (or
marketing) its product than did Company B (or had more failing products).
Company A may not be able to compete in the long run because of its
investment, but that doesn't mean that it is somehow in a different market than
Company B. Conversely, the fact that a company may invest in many different
movies (or shampoos or other products) over its life doesn't mean that those
products compete with each other in the same market; it just means the
company is diversifying its risk by taking a chance on many different products.
And while we may well want to encourage investments like Company A's by
granting IP rights, granting those rights works as an incentive precisely because
it does confer on Company A some power over price. To ignore that fact is to
ignore the tradeoffs associated with granting IP rights.
Second, even such a sweeping definition of costs wouldn't make the fact that
IP rights often confer market power go away. Some IP rights do in fact require a
substantial investment of research and development money to generate. But
others don't. Sometimes inventors stumble upon very valuable technologies by
accident. Songs can be recorded cheaply and written even more cheaply and
180. See, e.g., Matthew Herper, The Truly Staggering Cost of New Drugs, FORBES, Mar. 12, 2012, at
38 (finding that the average research and development cost per approved prescription drug, accounting
for unsuccessful projects, is between $4 and $12 billion and noting that less than one in ten prescription
drugs reaching the human trial stage are ultimately approved). That number is radically higher than
other estimates and is almost certainly inflated, but it does indicate the scope of the problem.
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still make millions for their creators. And trademarks in particular don't require
much in the way of investment to develop.s 1 The value of a brand is probably
positively correlated with the amount spent on marketing, but it seems unlikely
that even the most expansive definition of the cost of development ought to
include marketing expenses. If it did, then assessment of market definition and
market power would become a surreal investigation in which two products that
conferred equal profit margins would be treated differently because one com-
pany spent more money to promote its brand than did the other (the bigger
spender not being treated as a monopolist). Further, to count how much money
a company spends on marketing its successes or trying to develop failed
products is to fall into a version of the Cellophane Trap. If a company makes a
windfall of $100 million on a new product, just because it spends that money on
research into new products or on advertising doesn't mean that the product was
$100 million more costly. It just means the company had $100 million more to
spend.
Finally, even if the technically correct way to measure whether an IP right
produces returns above cost would be to compare all development costs for this
and related projects with all profits generated by the IP right during its reason-
ably anticipated marketable lifetime, in practice this is almost always impos-
sible. Not only does it require an enormous amount of information, it imposes
serious difficulties if the inquiry must be made (as it often will be) while the
product is on the market. Whether the price for Titanic is competitively suffi-
cient, inadequate, or excessive to cover the costs of making that movie and
other, less successful movies made by the same studio may not be knowable
until all copies of the movie have been sold and all other marketable license
rights exhausted.18 2
B. IS MARKET DEFINITION ITSELF A FLAWED ENTERPRISE?
Perhaps the problem lies not with how market definition is applied to IP
cases, but with the enterprise of market definition itself. Antitrust traditionally
defines markets in a binary sense-we put a product (and a geographic space) in
or out of the market. Then we use mathematical metrics to decide whether a
market is too concentrated to allow a merger or sufficiently concentrated that
the defendant is a monopolist. One problem is that we are making yes-no
decisions in cases that are analog, not digital. It is not the case that a video store
181. See, e.g., Ambrosia Chocolate Co. v. Ambrosia Cake Bakery, 165 F.2d 693, 697 (4th Cir. 1947)
("[A] man or [sic] ordinary intelligence could easily devise a score of valid trade-marks in a short
period of time."); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the
Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 397, 399 (1990) (finding little need for incentives to develop
trademarks).
182. That lifetime might be the statutory life of the grant in question or else the shorter time during
which sales of further licenses can be profitably made. For example, one patent (say the patent on
Lipitor, which expired in 2012) may generate strong royalties over its entire legal life. Another may
become obsolete and valueless within a year or two after its issuance.
20972012]
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JouRNAL
three miles away is a potential competitor while another one four miles away is
not. Rather, some .slightly larger number of consumers will travel three miles
than will travel four miles. Similarly, it is not the case that mid-priced four-door
sedans all compete perfectly with one another while hatchbacks comprise an
entirely separate market with no crossover. And clearly some-but not all-
customers will switch from brand-name drugs to lower-priced generics when
they become available.' 8 3 The current approach to market definition draws an
arbitrary line when what we need is a continuum that reflects the partial
differentiation of products and differences in the cost and convenience of those
products.184 That is especially true in IP markets, where the existence of the IP
right all but guarantees some amount of product differentiation, making the
yes-no framework of classical market definition particularly problematic.
The problem with market definition, however, may be more intractable than
just how it is assessed. In a provocative series of articles, Louis Kaplow has
argued that the entire enterprise of market definition is fundamentally flawed.'8 5
He points out that, to properly define markets, we must have sufficient data to
determine how an increase in the price of one good would affect purchases of
all other goods sufficiently close to be candidates for inclusion in the same
market. Further, we must make a policy judgment regarding how much of a
price increase we are willing to tolerate before defining the company that
increases its price as a monopolist. But if we have that information, we can
determine power over price directly, without ever having to define markets. 8 6
Market definition, Kaplow argues, is a fundamentally flawed enterprise because
it involves discarding useful information in order to make coarse determinations
when we could be making finer ones.' 8 7
183. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton, Market Definition: Use and Abuse, Comp. Po'Y INT'L, Spring
2007, at 3 (arguing that market definition efforts "are at best crude first steps to begin an analysis," the
primary use of which is as a threshold to weed out frivolous cases); David S. Evans, Lightening Up on
Market Definition, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF ANTrrRUST LAw 53, 89 (Einer Elhauge
ed., 2012) (market definition can play a useful role, but "there is no basis in economics for ...
drawing hard market boundaries").
185. See Kaplow, Market* Share, supra note 9; Kaplow, Why (Ever), supra note 9. For earlier
discussion of the topic, see Richard S. Markovits, Predicting the Competitive Impact of Horizontal
Mergers in a Monopolistically Competitive World: A Non-Market-Oriented Proposal and Critique of
the Market Definition-Market Share-Market Concentration Approach, 56 TEX. L. REv. 587 (1978).
186. Kaplow, Why (Ever), supra note 9, at 459-65.
187. A number of antitrust lawyers have challenged Kaplow's assessment. See Gregory J. Werden,
Why (Ever) Define Markets? An Answer to Professor Kaplow, available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=2004655; see also James A. Keyte & Kenneth B. Schwartz, "Tally-Ho!": UPP
and the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 77 ANTrrrUST L.J. 587, 591 n.17 (2011). A full analysis of
this debate is beyond the scope of this paper, but we think many of Werden's points actually
demonstrate the problems Kaplow identifies. For example, although Werden is correct that we use
market definition to do more than simply assess market share, and that it provides a compelling
narrative for a jury and a basis for assigning burdens of proof, none of those things are desirable if the
market definition is itself a flawed analysis.
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We think Kaplow has a point. Antitrust needs some way to assess the
competitive effects of behavior, and that requires some inquiry into who is
likely to be affected by that behavior and how. But it probably doesn't need (or
want) the kind of formalistic, mathematical framework of the old 1992 Merger
Guidelines. The 2010 Merger Guidelines move away from some of the line-
drawing of the traditional approach, placing much more emphasis on observed
competitive effects-looking, for example, at upward pricing pressure from
mergers and companies' responses to actual or threatened entry by a differenti-
ated product.188 That is, rather than predicting from numbers how markets will
behave, the new guidelines emphasize observable evidence of how conduct
affects (or doesn't affect) market outcomes. As a general matter, this is a good
thing because it is more realistic.' 89 And it may lead the way towards a good
compromise for IP cases, focusing not on artificial constructs nor on special
rules designed to make IP market power go away but on the observed reality of
how consumers interact with IP rights.' 90
But abandoning market definition, as Kaplow suggests, doesn't mean we can
abandon the effort to decide when IP rights confer market power. We may well
conclude that branded pharmaceuticals and their generic equivalents aren't in
the same market because of the large difference in their prices, but the presence
of the generic on a pharmacy shelf next to the branded product surely has some
influence on the price and output decisions of the brand owner-more than
does, say, the fact that the pharmacy also sells greeting cards. 91 Some evidence
of this is the great lengths to which pharmaceutical patent owners go to avoid
having generics enter the market even after their core patents expire, and the
fact that when generics do enter they take significant sales away from the brand
owner, as well as expanding the market to other customers.19 2 The equilibrium
after generic entry may separate into products that are priced differently, but
that doesn't mean the introduction of new generics or the prices they set have
no effect on branded pharmaceutical pricing or profits. In evaluating efforts by
pharmaceutical firms to exclude generic entry, antitrust must take those effects
188. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 10, § 2, at 2-6. For discussion, see Louis Kaplow, Market
Definition and the Merger Guidelines, 37 REv. INDUS. ORG. 107 (2011) (arguing that the 2010
Guidelines make an incremental step in the right direction but need to go further).
189. See Richard Gilbert & Daniel Rubinfeld, Revising the Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Lessons
from the US and the EU, in COMPETITION POLICY AND REGULATION: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA,
EUROPE, AND THE U.S. 262, 575 (M. Faure & Xinzhu Zhang eds., 2011) (advocating for a focus on
"deciding the conditions in which a merger is more or less likely to raise concerns about harm to
innovation"); Herbert Hovenkamp, Harm to Competition Under the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines, 37 REV. INDUS. ORG. 3, 4 (2011) (arguing that reducing focus on market definition is a "positive
development" compared to "overly technocratic" 1992 Guidelines).
190. See J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law, 5 J. COMPET-
nON L. & EcON. 581, 583, 585-86 (2009) (explaining that a focus on dynamic competition requires less
attention to market definition and market share).
191. We are indebted to Mark Kelman for this point.
192. See supra note 174.
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into account, whether or not it calls the process of doing so "market defini-
tion."193
Similarly, deciding where to look for effects on market outcomes requires
some implicit judgments about the relatedness of goods that traditional market
definition might class as in separate markets. If we're looking at the effects on
customers of regular ice cream in Dippin Dots, it doesn't look like there are
any; but if you look for effects on buyers of flash-frozen ice cream, you get a
different result. Classical market definition requires us to choose one of those
markets and to only look for effects there. A more realistic analysis looks for
competitive effects in a number of possible places and makes the presence or
absence of those effects the critical factor in the analysis.
Courts and agencies have tried various workarounds to classic market defini-
tion, perhaps in implicit recognition of the problems with the existing rules. For
instance, agencies and courts sometimes define "submarkets" within an antitrust
market.' 9 4 Alternatively, they speak of the "smallest relevant market" that meets
the SSNIP test.19 5 The "submarket" concept makes no sense; if a market is a
grouping of products that share high cross-elasticity of demand, a subset of that
group shouldn't have the power to raise prices without prompting consumers to
switch to the other products in the larger market. If a submarket is properly
defined, it means the market itself wasn't properly defined.19 6 The fact that
courts and agencies fall back on the idea means that they have some implicit
understanding that their market definition rules aren't leading them to logical
conclusions.
Sometimes courts or agencies simply ignore the implications of market
definition. In the pharmaceutical cases, for instance, no one actually believes
that pharmaceutical patents and their generic equivalents have no significant
effect on each other. We don't let the conclusion of our market definition
analysis interfere with our intuition that these two companies are in some sort of
competitive relationship.
Eliminating market definition, then, doesn't mean we stop trying to decide
how differentiated products relate to each other. That assessment is necessary to
any sort of antitrust analysis. And the evidence suggests that IP rights quite
often confer significant power over price. That shouldn't mean that different
IP-protected products are necessarily segregated into separate markets. But it
does mean that we can no longer assume that IP rights have little or no effect on
193. See Hovenkamp, supra note 174, at 2152-53; see also Malcolm B. Coate & Joseph J. Simons,
In Defense of Market Definition, ANrrrRUST BuLL. (forthcoming) (manuscript at i), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-id= 1967208 (arguing that the alternatives to market definition "lack the bench-
marks necessary to establish findings of monopoly power").
194. See, e.g., FTC v. Whole Foods Mkts., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("A broad
market may also contain relevant submarkets which themselves 'constitute product markets for antitrust
purposes."' (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962))).
195. 2010 GUIDELNES, supra note 10, § 4.1.2, at 10.
196. See 2B AREEDA & HovENKAMP, supra note 107, 533 ("Speaking of submarkets merely
confuses the issue.").
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price and market power.197 Consistent with the economic literature on IP and
product differentiation, IP rights will often confer significant power over price
and purchasing decisions, which means those rights will often tread on territory
we think of as reserved for antitrust law. Efforts by courts and scholars to
assume away any conflict between IP and antitrust are accordingly misguided.
The reality of this conflict doesn't mean antitrust law must always triumph;
there are good reasons for IP law to create at least some modest product
differentiation.' 9 8 But it does mean that the conflict cannot be wished away by
invoking the mantra that IP and antitrust law serve the same goals. 99
The problems with market definition also mean that antitrust law must pay
more attention to actual competitive effects and less attention to nice numerical
formulas in evaluating mergers and anticompetitive conduct. The 2010 Merger
Guidelines are an admirable step in the right direction. While they continue to
define markets and use the SSNIP test, this approach is merely one among
many, and it takes a back seat to an actual analysis of competitive relationships
and upward pricing pressure. 20 We think the Guidelines are right to pay less
attention to arbitrarily defined markets and more attention to the actual effects a
merger or a licensing practice will have on pricing and output decisions across a
range of differentiated products.
IV LESSONS FOR IP
In our view, the difficulty courts have experienced with market definition in
IP cases stems, at least in part, from their (perhaps intuitive) resistance to
relying on the antitrust understanding of markets. The antitrust approach, as we
have argued, derives from a classical conception of competition involving
undifferentiated goods where producers compete solely on price and quality.
But markets for goods encumbered by IP rights are different: these goods are,
by definition, differentiated, either in terms of some product feature or because
of the product's branding. This product differentiation isn't unequivocally bad,
of course. Indeed, markets characterized by differentiated products often give
consumers choices and that can enhance consumer welfare. 2 0 ' And in some
197. But see Sheridan v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 530 F.3d 590, 595 (7th Cir. 2008) (dismissing the
"slight monopoly power" trademarks enable). Desai and Waller ably explain why this back-of-the-hand
rejection of the power IP rights confer over price won't suffice. Desai & Waller, supra note 119, at
1473-76.
198. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, supra note 103.
199. See Mark A. Lemley, Industry-Specific Antitrust Policy for Innovation, 2011 COLUM. Bus. L.
REv. 637 (2011).
200. For explanation and a defense of this move, see Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77 ANrTIRUST L.J. 49 (2010).
201. See Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, supra note 103; see also Apostolos Chronopou-
los, Trade Dress Rights as Instruments of Monopolistic Competition: Towards a Rejuvenation of the
Misappropriation Doctrine in Unfair Competition Law and a Property Theory of Trademarks, 16
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 119, 130-36 (2012) (arguing that strong rights in product design and limits
on functionality defenses will spur competition by increasing product variety).
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cases we need to confer some power over price on IP owners as part of a
government policy to drive investment in innovation.2 02 But these benefits come
at a cost to the extent differentiation insulates some IP owners from competi-
tion. And we think the evidence suggests that this cost can be significant:
contrary to some suggestions, entry of additional differentiated products in
response to supracompetitive pricing often does not undermine pricing power
precisely because IP rights guarantee those new entrants will only be imperfect
substitutes.20 3
This is not to say, however, that all IP rights create market power that
antitrust should care about, or even that all IP rights have the same effect on
substitution. Indeed, we suspect that the effects of an IP right are likely to be
quite different in a variety of respects. They may vary by IP right (patent vs.
copyright vs. trademark) because each of those rights will attach, generally
speaking, to different features. They may vary by the type of product or service
at issue. And they may vary by industry, even perhaps with respect to the same
type of product or service. The general point is that the competitive costs of IP
rights vary with the extent to which they enable the owners of those rights to
exclude close substitutes, and courts should therefore conceive of competition
in the IP space in terms of the quality of available substitutes. Rather than
considering whether a particular product is in the relevant market, courts must
at a minimum think of competition as existing along a spectrum. The further
away one product is from another on that spectrum (that is, the more imperfect
it is as a substitute), the less we can see the product as effectively constraining
the price of the first product or offering a realistic alternative to many consum-
ers. Indeed, there may be multiple dimensions to the differentiation, including
price, quality, and (for IP goods) brand association.
Conceiving of competition in this way does not obviate the need for a policy
judgment, of course, any more than avoiding explicit market definition in
antitrust allowed us to escape a focus on competitive effects. For even if courts
take the approach we suggest and focus on the relative closeness of available
substitutes, determining when the substitutes are sufficiently close that we can
count them as competing goods entails a judgment about how much competi-
202. This is the basic public goods story at the heart of IP law. For discussion, see Mark A. Lemley,
The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993-1000 (1997).
203. Yoo argues, for example, that the market for copyrighted works is best seen through a product
differentiation lens and that there is less reason to be concerned about the competitive effects of
copyright so long as it is possible for substitutes to enter. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation,
supra note 103. We agree with Yoo that product differentiation is a better way of viewing markets for
copyrighted works and, indeed, IP markets generally. But we have less faith that entry of new
expressive works in the same genre will necessarily limit market power, just as we think entry of new
brands in the luxury handbag market is unlikely to bring luxury handbag prices down anywhere near
marginal cost. And, as we note below, how effective entry will be is itself a function of the breadth of
legal rights that limit that entry. Cf Heald, supra note 149 (showing that creation of different
copyrighted works does not constrain price as effectively as being able to compete to sell the same
work).
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tion we want in this space. And such a policy judgment must be made at two
levels: (1) at the level of specific cases, where courts must define a market in
order to determine, for example, the amount of damages to award a patent
plaintiff; and (2) at the rule level-where courts and/or Congress affect the
extent of IP-based product differentiation by determining the scope of IP rights
generally.
At the level of specific cases, we think that IP law can learn something from a
more flexible antitrust market definition, despite the many flaws in antitrust's
approach. Because courts in antitrust cases use market definition for the ulti-
mate purpose of assessing market power, and because those courts treat market
power differently in different contexts, market definition itself tends to look
different in different antitrust contexts. Market definition, in other words, has
many masters in antitrust, just as it does in IP. Hence, although IP courts should
think more coherently about the nature of competition between IP-protected
products, they might well make different policy judgments in different circum-
stances about when products are sufficiently close that they raise competitive
concerns. Some of the contexts we identified in which market definition arises
in IP cases reflect courts' attempts to limit the competitive consequences of IP
rights. And the extent to which courts ought to be concerned about those
competitive costs depends on the importance of the type of protection the
plaintiff in that case seeks relative to the purposes of the IP doctrine at issue. In
our view, for example, the benefits of trademark protection for product design
features are quite low-consumers are likely to have several other indicators by
which they can identify the source of the product at issue (packaging, brand
names, etc.), so protection of the product design itself often has relatively little
marginal source-identifying value. Thus, we think it would be entirely appropri-
ate for courts to define markets narrowly in functionality cases where competi-
tive need is relevant, so that close substitutes would need to be available to
avoid a finding of functionality. Likewise, if we were confident that patent law's
eligibility doctrines adequately distinguished inventions that truly deserved a
patent from more trivial innovations, then courts in patent infringement cases
might also be justified in defining markets narrowly there for the purpose of
ensuring adequate compensation.
The general point is that the methodology courts use to define the relevant
market is distinct from the purpose for which that market definition is made. In
terms of methodology, we think courts need to focus on the quality of available
substitutes in the market, defined by consumer demand and not merely (and in
some cases perhaps not at all) in terms of function. How close those substitutes
need to be for a court to declare them to be in the same market depends on the
purpose for which the court is engaged in market definition. And because those
purposes differ, the policy judgment about when alternatives are sufficiently
close to consider them in the same market might differ as well.
At the more general level of the appropriate scope of IP rights, the question is
when an IP right creates or enables so much differentiation that the costs of IP
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protection are too high to justify their benefits. Resolving that question requires
policymakers to ask how much market power we want an IP owner to have, and
that determination is bound up with the policy justifications of IP rights in the
first place. If, for example, we believe patent rights are important to create
incentives to invent (or to commercialize), then patent rights should be struc-
tured to enable sufficient differentiation to provide the incentive, but no more.2 04
Likewise, if trademark law's goal is to enable consumers to rely on trademarks
when deciding what goods or services to buy, then we may have to tolerate
some brand-based differentiation for a trademark to serve its function, even if
differentiation is itself not trademark law's goal.
We don't purport to answer the question of "how much market power is
sufficient" in this Article. That is the collective subject of most IP scholarship.
We have articulated views on particular facets of that question in the past, often
(but not always) suggesting that IP rights today are unduly broad. 2 0 5 But you
don't need to agree with that for our argument here to work. Our point is that IP
rights are not free. Though IP and antitrust doctrine and scholarship have
minimized the presence of a conflict between the two in recent decades, IP
rights do in fact confer significant power over price in a surprising array of
cases. The IP-antitrust conflict, then, is more significant than most people
acknowledge.
If we wish to restrict the extent to which IP rights confer market power, and
therefore minimize the range of conflict between the doctrines, we should focus
on IP doctrines through which differentiation could be reduced. Those are the
most efficient ways to reduce the harm caused by IP while still protecting IP
rights. Put differently, to reduce the competitive costs of IP rights we can adjust
doctrinal rules for the purpose of enabling closer substitutes.2 06 In this Part, we
identify some doctrinal contexts we see as especially conducive to tailoring for
the purpose of enabling closer substitution.2 0 7
A. COPYRIGHT
1. Substantial Similarity and the Derivative Work Right
In the copyright area, courts could use a number of doctrinal levers to lessen
the distance between the copyrighted work and available substitutes. First,
204. Cf Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE
L.J. 1590 (2011) (arguing that only inventions for which a patent was necessary to induce the invention
should be patentable).
205. Among many others, see Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STrAN. L.
REV. 413 (2010); Lemley & McKenna, supra note 46.
206. An alternative approach would apply antitrust law in cases involving market power, even
though that power was conferred by an IP right. As we noted in the previous two Parts, that approach is
likely to lead to some perverse results given the cunent structure of antitrust law, and we do not favor it
207. Again, you don't have to agree with us that IP rights ought to be tailored to reduce differentia-
tion. Even if you think IP rights should enable greater differentiation, these doctrines are especially
conducive to achieving that end too, though they would need to be adjusted in the opposite direction.
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courts could require much greater similarity between a plaintiff's and defen-
dant's works in order for the defendant's work to be considered "substantially
similar" and therefore infringing.20 8 As things stand, although a plaintiff must
prove that the defendant's work is substantially similar, the meaning of "substan-
tial" has broadened significantly over time. Whereas the defendant's work once
would have needed to be virtually identical to the plaintiff's in order to be
considered an infringement,20 9 courts now find infringement based on frag-
mented literal similarity 21 0 and nonliteral or pattern similarity, including similari-
ties in plot and/or characters. 2 1 1 As a consequence, a copyright owner now can
block works that are less similar to their own, meaning they can force third
parties to produce less perfect substitutes. Courts could reduce the competitive
costs of copyright, then, by requiring greater similarity to prove infringement.
Likewise, the derivative work right currently enables copyright owners to
create further space around their own work by excluding related or follow-on
works that might be closer substitutes for the copyright owner's own work than
208. The standard of similarity is quite lenient. See, e.g., Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co.,
429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970); Peter Pan Fabrics v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d
Cir. 1960); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). For discussion and criticism, see Mark
A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System For Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 J. CoPYRIGHT Soc'Y 719
(2010).
209. Neither translations nor "fair abridgments," for example, were considered infringing. See, e.g.,
Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 208 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (finding that an unauthorized translation of
Uncle Tom's Cabin from English to German did not infringe copyright); Sayre v. Moore, (1785) 1 East
361 (K.B.) (holding defendant's improvements on a copyrighted nautical chart might be sufficient to
avoid infringement); Gyles v. Wilcox, (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch.), 490, 2 Atk. 141, 143 (finding that
abridgment of copyrighted volume of crown law was not infringing).
210. See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][2] (2011). In
general, for fragments of a work to be significant enough to constitute infringement, the fragments must
be qualitatively important to the work and not simply random isolated bits. See Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985) (finding infringement based on verbatim
copying of 300 to 400 words from book manuscript, where excerpts took the "heart" of the book); see
also Murray Hill Publ'ns, Inc. v. ABC Commc'ns, Inc., 264 F.3d 622, 633 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that,
to constitute infringement, a single line taken from a protected work would have to be "an integral part"
of that work rather than "merely an incidental part of the background" and, by analogy, as "'readily
recognizable' in terms of its relationship . . . as 'E.T. phone home' is to its movie source" (citations
omitted)); Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Heim v. Universal Pictures
Co., 154 F.2d 480, 488 (2nd Cir. 1946) for the proposition that a "single brief phrase so idiosyncratic as
to preclude coincidence might suffice to show copying"). This trend was taken to the extreme in some
music cases. See, e.g., Robertson v. Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 795, 798
(S.D. Cal. 1956) (finding infringement based on copying of two bars of music). And some courts in
digital sampling cases have rejected any notion that the amount taken might be de minimus and
therefore noninfringing. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801-02
(6th Cir. 2005).
211. Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1947) (noting that an
"infringement is not confined to literal and exact repetition or reproduction; it includes also the various
modes in which the matter of any work may be adopted, imitated, transferred, or reproduced, with more
or less colorable alterations to disguise the piracy" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted));
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) ("[W]e do not doubt that two plays
may correspond in plot closely enough for infringement.").
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would be unrelated third-party works. The right, therefore, forces third parties
to market more imperfect substitutes than they might if they were able to build
more directly on the copyrighted work. We could decrease copyright owners'
power here by significantly curtailing or eliminating the derivative work right,
thereby allowing better substitutes in the market. To put it more concretely, if
consumers do not regard Stephen King novels as good substitutes for a new
Harry Potter book, then we would better reduce the market power of Harry
Potter books by weakening the derivative work right and allowing new Harry
Potter-related works in at least some contexts.
The economics of derivative rights are more complex, however, than the
economics of substantial similarity. Whereas substantial similarity affects how
close a substitute a defendant can make, in many cases derivative works are
complements rather than substitutes for the original work, as the derivative
works are frequently directed at different markets. A Harry Potter encyclopedia
doesn't substitute for sales of the series; it is likely useful only to those who
have already read the series.2 12 We may or may not want to give J.K. Rowling
control over such a complement, but it doesn't compete with the original in any
meaningful way. By contrast, other derivative works might serve as both
complements (or other noncompeting goods) and substitutes. Translations ex-
pand the market to reach those who speak a different language, but the bilingual
might choose the French version of Muriel Barbery's "The Elegance of the
Hedgehog" over the English one. For the latter, the translations are substitutes.
Similarly, movie versions of books are complements for those who want to read
the book and then see the movie, but substitutes for those who opt for one but
not the other. Finally, even when a derivative work is clearly a complement for
some consumers (those who read the Harry Potter books and then also want to
see the movie), it may be that this kind of complement is also a better substitute
for the original than some other type of work. Some consumers, for example,
might rather watch the Harry Potter movies in place of the Harry Potter books
than switch to a Stephen King novel. This doesn't mean Harry Potter movies are
particularly good substitutes for the book, only that Stephen King novels, or
whatever else is the next best substitute for Harry Potter books, are compara-
tively worse substitutes.
Depending on how frequently the last situation arises, where a derivative
work is both a complement and a better substitute than the next best substitute
in the same medium as the original, our analysis might have a surprising
implication: if we are concerned only with market power and substitution, we
might want to focus more on limiting the scope of the copying right than on
restricting the derivative works right. Among derivative works, we might care
more about controlling power over that subset of works likely to serve as a
212. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting the
lack of substititution but finding no fair use).
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substitute for the existing work, rather than derivatives that expand into a new
market or act as complements to the original work. This may seem counterintui-
tive; the case for giving a copyright owner control over derivative works is
213generally regarded as weaker than the case for preventing copying. And it
may be that there is no need for incentives from derivative works to encourage
creation. But from the perspective of market power and, hence, the IP-antitrust
conflict, it may be that the breadth of the substantial similarity doctrine is doing
more to give copyright owners market power than the derivative works right.
2. Fair Use
As we noted above, the fair use doctrine is directly concerned with market
substitution. The all-important fourth factor of the fair use analysis asks whether
the defendant's use has a market effect on the plaintiff. In essence, that
privileges uses that don't substitute for the copyrighted work but allows copy-
right owners to control uses that do substitute.
If we wanted to reduce the market power of copyright owners, one way to do
so would be to refine this analysis. Sometimes a defendant's product harms the
market for the copyrighted work because it is the copyrighted elements that
make the defendant's work desirable. If people want to buy my review of
Gerald Ford's autobiography only because of the words it takes from that
autobiography, the fact that I have added my own words (and hence "trans-
formed" the original) is irrelevant.2 14 But at other times the defendant's work is
substituting for the original, causing market harm, but the market harm results
not from the copyrighted work but from the defendant's new expression. If
people buy my rap song in preference to the song from which I sampled not
because I sampled that song but because mine is better, that market harm is not
attributable to the copyright infringement in any meaningful sense.2 15 Similarly,
if it is the unprotectable elements of the copyright owner's work that make my
216
copy desirable, proof of substitution should not preclude a finding of fair use.
Fair use, then, could refine its focus on market harm by imposing a causation
requirement of sorts. Market substitution should counsel against a finding of fair
use only if the market-substituting effect can be traced to the protectable
elements of the copyrighted work.
213. 2 NIMER & NIMMER, supra note 210, § 8.09[A]; cf Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and
Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'v 209 (1982) (defending the derivative works
doctrine while acknowledging challenges to it).
214. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566-69.
215. Cf Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592-93 (1994) (discussing competition
in the market for rap derivatives).
216. This was arguably the court's error in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913,
931 (2d Cir. 1994), which found liability even though defendants were interested in copying plaintiff's
journal articles for the ideas they contained, not for their copyrightable expression.
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B. TRADEMARK
1. Mark Similarity
A number of scholars, including us, have argued recently that trademark
rights should be narrower and more certain in scope.217 In large measure, these
calls have focused on the requisite similarity of goods-the range of goods or
services against which a mark owner could assert its rights. And rights could be
narrowed by requiring that the defendant's goods or services be highly similar,
or even identical, to the plaintiff's. 21 8 But if our goal is to reduce the differentia-
tion afforded by a trademark and make other products better substitutes, then
focusing on the closeness of the goods with which the marks are used is only a
part of the story. What we should want at least as much is to make more
available the differentiating features, which in the trademark context means the
marks themselves. We should, in other words, want to allow other parties to get
closer to the claimed trademark. One means of accomplishing this in the trade
dress context is a robust functionality doctrine, which would prevent parties
from claiming certain features as trademarks at all. But in the broad range of
cases, the best way to accomplish this would be for courts to put significant
weight on the similarity of the marks factor of the likelihood of confusion test,
requiring as a necessary condition of liability that the defendant's mark be
extremely similar (if not identical) to the plaintiff's claimed mark. We think this
may well be particularly important in the trade dress context, both because trade
dress is often less clearly defined and because in many cases product packaging
or design elements may be the most effective way to communicate that one's
product competes with another known product.
As we noted above, how much we want to limit the differentiation enabled by
IP rights generally is a question bound up with the policy justifications of
various forms of IP. And in the trademark context it may be that some amount
of product differentiation is inevitably the byproduct of protection. But we think
current law is nowhere near the point at which we need to be concerned about
cutting back too far on trademark rights such that consumers are exposed to
uses that would cause material confusion. Courts have found marks to be
confusingly similar even if they seem to have very little in common, often,
though not exclusively, in cases where the mark the plaintiff claims was
infringed was only one aspect of the defendant's overall branding. 219 Failing to
217. See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, supra note 120; Lemley & McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, supra
note 205; Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modem Trademark Law's Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA L. REv. 63
(2009).
218. Doctrinally this could be accomplished by putting much more weight on the similarity of the
goods factor in the multifactor likelihood-of-confusion tests that courts use to determine infringement.
219. See, e.g., Maker's Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 703 F. Supp. 2d 671, 696-97
(W.D. Ky. 2010) (finding likelihood of confusion regarding association when defendant used similar
red dripping wax seal but a different brand name for its tequila), aff'd, No. 10-5508, 2012 WL 1605755
(6th Cir. May 9, 2012); Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., No. 6:92-cv-00460, 1992 WL 436279, at
*23-*25 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 3, 1992) (granting injunction against defendant's use of confusingly similar
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require a high degree of similarity broadens the scope of the trademark, making
it less likely that a competitor can either evoke a mark for purposes of
comparison or even communicate clearly that it views itself as in the same
market as a leading brand.2 2 0 There are reasons to impose those limits if the
alternative is that consumers are deceived in ways that might affect their
purchasing decisions, but too often courts seem to impose those limits-and
accordingly raise a trademark owner's power over price-even when confusion
is unlikely.
2. Sponsorship or Affiliation Confusion and Dilution
In some cases trademarks serve as differentiating features simply because
they are serving the function of a trademark, giving consumers information
about the nature of the goods with which the mark is used. The Coca-Cola
mark, for example, helps differentiate Coca-Cola from Pepsi or other drinks by
telling consumers about the taste of the beverage bearing that mark. But this is
hardly the only, or even the primary, way trademarks enable differentiation. In
many cases brand meaning is not tied to any particular characteristics of the
actual product but merely reflects people's associations with the brand itself.
The mark, in other words, doesn't merely reflect differences in the products; in
a significant way, it is the difference. So understood, the way to decrease
differentiation (to enable better substitutes) is to decrease mark owners' ability
to control that brand meaning.
Under current law, mark owners protect this brand meaning primarily through
broad sponsorship or affiliation claims in contexts far beyond those in which
consumers could reasonably believe the mark owner was responsible for the
quality of the defendants' goods or services. 2 2 ' But they also protect this
meaning more directly through dilution claims, which are intended to protect
the singularity of a mark's meaning.22 2 To reduce brand owners' ability to
differentiate along this brand meaning dimension, both of these types of claims
could be eliminated or at least substantially limited.
Like the derivative works right in copyright, the analysis here is complicated
by uncertainty as to whether the defendants in these cases are offering substitute
marks despite dissimilar package shape, which was the only inherently distinctive element of plaintiff's
trade dress); Source Perrier, S.A. v. Waters of Saratoga Springs, Inc., No. 81-cv-0178, 1982 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9981, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 1982) (explaining that the "fact that [defendant] placed a different
label on its confusingly similar bottle does not alter" result of confusion and trade dress infringement).
In the registration context, courts sometimes find marks similar based solely on similarity in
meaning. See Hancock v. Am. Steel & Wire Co. of N.J., 203 F.2d 737, 740 (C.C.P.A. 1953) (holding
"Hurricane" confusingly similar to "Cyclone" for fencing materials).
220. Cases involving private label goods have gotten this right in our view. See, e.g., McNeil
Nutritionals, LLC v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 511 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2007) (contrasting noninfring-
ing and infringing store-brand packaging); Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556 (Fed.
Cir. 1994). But there is no reason why the lessons of these cases should be confined to that context.
221. Lemley & McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, supra note 205.
222. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
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products at all. There may be, as we have argued elsewhere, little reason to give
trademark owners control over marks in markets they are unlikely ever to
enter.223 But in most cases, where the defendant's goods are sufficiently far
afield from the plaintiff's, that control is unlikely to confer market power in any
significant sense. From the perspective of the IP-antitrust conflict, then, the
most troubling applications of the sponsorship/affiliation and dilution cases are
not those that occur in remote markets, but those that affect actual or likely
substitutes. When a trademark owner uses dilution to make up for holes in its
likelihood-of-confusion case against a competitor, for instance, it is interfering
with expected market competition that trademark law ought to allow. 2 24 Thus, it
is a serious problem that dilution claims in practice turn out overwhelmingly to
be redundant of broad sponsorship or affiliation claims.225 Similarly, when a
trademark owner asserts a dilution claim against a reseller of its goods or an
infringement claim against a supplier of service for its branded cars,22 6 that suit
has real costs to competition because it is targeting a lawful substitute for the
trademark owner's goods or services.
There is one further complication that deserves mention here. In some
cases-most likely, in our view, in the context of luxury brands-it may be that
it is access to a mark that itself defines the relevant market. For example,
223. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 46.
224. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, 191 F.3d 208, 221-23 (2d Cir. 1999) (precluding Nabisco
competitor from selling fish-shaped crackers despite the absence of consumer confusion).
225. Barton Beebe, The Continuing Debacle of U.S. Antidilution Law: Evidence from the First Year
of Trademark Dilution Revision Act Case Law, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 449
(2008). A few state dilution statutes have made it a requirement that the defendant's good be
noncompetitive, and our analysis suggests that, to whatever extent dilution claims are justified, these
limitations are good ones if the goal is to reduce market power. The Illinois dilution statute, for
example, 765 ILL. COMP. STAr. 1036/65 (1998), does not apply to competitors. See Thomas & Betts
Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 935 F Supp. 1399, 1419 (N.D. Ill. 1996), rev'd in part on other grounds, 138
F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 1998) ("The Illinois Anti-Dilution act does not apply to competitors." (citing EZ
Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Cox Trailers, Inc., 746 F.2d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 1984))).
226. See Ga. Pac. Consumer Prods., LP v. Von Drehle Corp., 618 F.3d 441 (4th Cir. 2010) (denying
summary judgment because of fact questions about whether restroom visitors would be confused as to
source of paper toweling dispensed from manufacturer's branded dispensers when dispensers were
loaded with competitor's generic paper toweling); Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d
903 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that dealer's use of plaintiff's mark infringed because its telephone
directory advertising falsely suggested that dealer was a franchisee of the plaintiff); Harley-Davidson
Motor Co. v. Iron Eagle of Cent. Fla., Inc., 973 F Supp. 1421, 1425 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (holding that
seller of replacement parts for Harley-Davidson motorcycles infringed because its use of the marks was
likely to confuse customers into thinking that the shop was an authorized dealer).
Even when courts reject mark owners' claims in these cases, they leave open the possibility of many
more suits by making the issue of fair use depend on whether the use causes confusion. See, e.g., Scott
Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 484 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding that a dealer in Kirby
vacuums could use the Kirby mark in a Yellow Pages advertisement, but only if the ad did not cause
confusion: "[i]ndependent dealers and repair shops may use a mark to advertise truthfully that they sell
or repair certain branded products so long as the advertisement does not suggest affiliation or
endorsement by the markholder"); see also Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir.
2012) (reversing grant of summary judgment for Google and concluding that nominative use depends
on analysis of the likelihood of consumer confusion).
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marketing literature makes clear that "luxury" sometimes serves as a superordi-
nate category for consumers, such that luxury watches might compete more
with luxury handbags than with nonluxury watches. And this may well extend
to individual brands in some cases: Louis Vuitton watches might be better
substitutes for Louis Vuitton handbags than Gap handbags are for Louis Vuitton
handbags. Where that is true, the idea of defining markets in relation to product
categories doesn't make sense; the relevant market is more meaningfully de-
fined by the brand itself than by traditional product categories. In those cases we
cannot be comforted about the competitive effects of dilution protection even if
the claims were confined to different goods, because it would not be the
difference in goods that matters for purposes of market power.
3. Comparative and Keyword Advertising
To the extent nontrademark characteristics of products or services make them
good substitutes for the plaintiff's products, comparative advertising can be an
effective way of constraining market power by bringing those potential substi-
tutes to the attention of consumers. And trademark law has long allowed parties
to use the trademarks of their competitors in order to enable them to draw
attention to the substitutability of their products.2 27 The difficulty is that courts
have articulated the comparative advertising defense in ways that make it both
less sure and less predictable because they have always attached a caveat that
the defendant's use cannot cause confusion. 228 Given the breadth of modem
confusion doctrine, this is an important caveat-where the plaintiff can argue
that the use causes initial interest confusion, even if entirely accurate, competi-
tors must be willing to litigate, even in cases in which they are ultimately
vindicated.
The uncertainty of the defense is compounded by the fact that plaintiffs of
late have used the advent of new technology that enables comparative advertis-
ing as a reason to try to get courts to restrict the ability of competitors to engage
in comparative ads. Particularly concerning are cases in which plaintiffs assert
trademark claims against intermediaries, like search engines, or even against
advertisers themselves-despite the fact that the actual advertisement at issue is
not even alleged to be false-claiming that the simple fact of using the
plaintiff's mark as a keyword or as part of the text (which might allow it to turn
up in response to an Internet search) is itself enough to cause confusion,
227. See, e.g., Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1968); see also Hypertherm, Inc. v.
Precision Prods., Inc., 832 F.2d 697, 701 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that "an 'imitator may use in a truthful
way an originator's trademark when advertising that the imitator's product is a copy,' so long as no
confusion as to the source is likely to result" (quoting Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Labs.,
Inc., 815 F.2d 500, 503 (8th Cir. 1987))).
228. See 4 McCARHY, supra note 48, § 25:52 ("[I]t is neither trademark infringement nor unfair
competition to truthfully compare competing products in advertising, and in doing so, to identify by
trademark, the competitor's goods. However, such comparative advertising will not be permitted if it is
likely to confuse buyers as to exactly what they are getting.").
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thereby 229-fdisqualifying it from being considered comparative advertising. 230
Even though advertisers and search engines ultimately have prevailed in most of
these cases, generally it has only been after litigation on the likelihood of
confusion issue.2 31
Our analysis provides a strong defense for comparative advertising and
suggests that recent potential narrowing of the defense is a mistake from the
standpoint of concerns about substitution. To the extent other parties' goods or
services can serve as substitutes, trademark law should make it easy for those
parties to bring their goods to consumers' attention.
C. THE SCOPE OF PATENT RIGHTS
The scope of patent rights is a function of the language of the patent claims.
Accordingly, any effort to modulate the market power conferred by a patent
needs to start with the doctrines of claim construction and infringement. As a
general matter, application of those doctrines is case-specific: much turns on the
particular words chosen by the patentee and what the court construes those
words to mean. But precisely because the focus is on the words chosen by the
patent lawyers rather than on what the patentee actually built, patentees have
been able to obtain patents that cover broad swaths of conceptual space.
One reason patents are often read broadly is that patent lawyers frequently
claim their inventions in functional terms. Rather than limiting the patent to a
particular device, patentees claim any device that performs a particular function.
This will often, though not always, coincide with market power because control
over a particular function may make the development of an effective substitute
impossible.
Broad functional claiming was popular a century ago, but courts struck down
those claims because they were not tied to particular machine implementa-
tions.2 32 In the Patent Act of 1952, Congress allowed claim elements to be
written in functional language but provided that those claims did not cover any
means for performing the specified function, just the implementations actually
229. There may be other cases in which the claim against an advertiser is based on false or
misleading statements within the text of the ads themselves. To the extent the actionable confusion in
those other cases is caused by the nature of the use within the ad, the cases are less objectionable,
though they still implicate the concern that comparative advertising is not really a defense separate
from likelihood of confusion.
230. See, e.g., Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir.
2011) (finding no likelihood of confusion); Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir.
2009) (stating that the keyword advertising claim could not be decided on a motion to dismiss because
it depended on evidence of confusion). Full disclosure: one of us (Lemley) represented Google in the
Rescuecom matter.
231. See, e.g., Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 123. Rescuecom abandoned its case on remand during
discovery. For another case, see GEICO v. Google Inc., No. 1:04CV507, 2005 WL 1903128 (E.D. Va.,
Aug. 8, 2005) (Google prevailed on keyword advertising claim at trial). In full disclosure, one of us
(Lemley) represented Google in the GEICO matter.
232. See, e.g., Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245, 256-57 (1928).
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disclosed in the specification and equivalents thereof.23 3 Nonetheless, functional
claiming outside the scope of section 112 persists, particularly in the software
industry. Software and Internet patentees can get around functional claiming
restrictions by claiming computer hardware elements programmed to perform
particular functions. Because the precise hardware chosen is essentially irrel-
evant to the invention, these hardware claim elements provide no real limit on
the scope of the claim, but they take it outside the language of section 112.234
One way to limit the reach of patent claims, especially in software, is to take
seriously the old idea that functional claiming is not permitted and to limit the
patentee to what she actually invented or equivalents thereof.2 35 Indeed, some
(including one of us) have suggested going even further: returning to the days of
central claiming.2 36 Doing so wouldn't necessarily reduce the market power of
particular inventions; how much control a patent gave its owner over a market
would depend on the latitude the courts gave any given patentee to sue accused
infringers who sold substitutes with somewhat different characteristics. But
limiting functional claiming would at least require courts to think consciously
about the breadth of a patent owner's control rather than subordinating it to an
exercise in the interpretation of documents.
The control that patentees have over markets is also a function of a power
that patents confer that copyrights and trade secrets don't: the power to prevent
independent development. The power of a copyright is limited by the ability of
others working independently to develop their own works, even if those works
are similar in significant respects to the copyrighted work. Patents, by contrast,
give the patentee control over product space whether or not the defendant
copied from the patentee. Indeed, patents today are overwhelmingly asserted,
not against accused copyists but against independent developers. Some have
suggested that patent law, like copyright, should limit its reach to those who
obtain the idea from the patentee.2 3 8 That may or may not be a good idea. 2 39 But
233. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
234. See Mark A. Lemley, The Return of Functional Claiming (working paper 2012) (on file with
author); Mark A. Lemley, David W. O'Brien & Wade Malone, Capability Claiming (Feb. 2012)
(unpublished presentation) (making this argument), available at https://www.law.stanford.edu/display/
images/dynamic/events media/Panel%201%20-%2oMark%2OLemley,%20et%20al%20-%20Capability%
20Claiming.pdf.
235. See Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SEoN HALL L. REV. I
(2012) (arguing that modem practice illegitimately allows patentees to claim far beyond what they have
invented).
236. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim
Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1743 (2009).
237. Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REv. 1421
(2009).
238. Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent Invention Defense in Intellectual
Property, 69 EcONOMICA 535 (2002); Carl Shapiro, Prior User Rights, 96 AM. EcoN. REv. 92 (2006);
Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REv. 475
(2006).
239. For discussion and some skepticism, see Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require
Proof of Copying?, 105 MIcH. L. REV. 1525 (2007).
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if adopted, it would substantially reduce the number of cases in which patents
conferred market power by allowing an important source of substitutes.
D. EXPERIMENTAL USE AND REVERSE ENGINEERING
Looking at the issue of substitutes more dynamically, courts might make
more room for parties to design around patented inventions or copyrighted
works by enabling greater access to and experimentation with those inventions
and works. In the patent context, this would primarily take the form of a
much-expanded experimental use doctrine, which the Federal Circuit now
interprets quite narrowly. Under the Madey v. Duke University standard, 240 "so
long as the act is in furtherance of the alleged infringer's legitimate business
and is not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosoph-
ical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very narrow and strictly limited
experimental use defense." 2 4 ' And in Madey, the Federal Circuit interpreted
those disqualifying business interests very broadly, noting that even research at
nonprofit universities is usually not experimental use because, while those
universities "often sanction and fund research projects with arguably no commer-
cial application whatsoever," the projects "unmistakably further the institution's
legitimate business objectives."2 42 Among other things, the projects further the
objectives of "educating and enlightening students and faculty participating in
these projects" and of "increas[ing] the status of the institution and lure lucra-
tive research grants, students and faculty." 2 43
Because in many cases experimenting with a patented invention may be
necessary in order to learn how it works so that substitutes might be created, the
current doctrine does not enable as much competitive entry as it might. A
revised doctrine that insulated otherwise infringing activity that is necessary to
the ultimate development of a noninfringing substitute-in other words, making
or using an invention in the research and development phase of a new invention
rather than making consumptive use of a research tool2 4-would do a better
job of enabling entry of substitutes. As a practical matter, however, experimen-
tal use may occur even in the absence of a legal right, simply because infringe-
ment that occurs only in a laboratory is hard to detect.
Something similar could be said in the copyright context. The Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act ("DMCA") 245 prohibits the circumvention of copy restric-
240. 307 F.3d 1351, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
241. Id. at 1362.
242. Id.
243. Id. There is a separate, statutory experimental use exemption for developing information to be
submitted to the Food and Drug Administration in connection with a generic drug application, 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006), but it is quite narrow. See Merck KGaA v. Integra Life Sciences I, Ltd., 545
U.S. 193, 206-07 (2005).
244. For more on this distinction and its importance, see, for example, Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017
(1989).
245. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
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tions even where the purpose of that circumvention is to make a use of a
protected work that is not itself illegal. Although the statute does exempt certain
circumvention done for the purposes of achieving interoperability, 246 interoper-
able products may often be complements to, rather than substitutes for, the
copyrighted work protected by the technological measures. Thus, a broader
exemption that enabled circumvention for the purpose of reverse engineering to
develop a noninfringing but competitive work might promote market substi-
tutes.24 7 The point here, just as in the patent context, is to free those who might
create closer substitutes for the relevant invention or work of authorship to
engage in the activities necessary to the creation of such a substitute.
E. EXHAUSTION AND THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE
Finally, one set of doctrines crosses all doctrinal boundaries. Going by the
name "exhaustion" or "first sale," copyright, patent, and trademark all impose
limits on the ability of IP rightsholders to control what happens to particular
copies of their goods once they have sold those goods into the open market.
Section 109 of the Copyright Act, for instance, gives owners of lawfully
made copies the right to distribute those copies, even though distribution would
otherwise violate one of the copyright owner's exclusive rights.2 48 Trademark
law too recognizes the right of legitimate owners of branded goods to resell, and
even to advertise the resale of, those goods. 24 9 And patent law treats exhaustion
of rights upon first sale as a fundamental limitation on the scope of the
patent.250
The first-sale or exhaustion doctrine is a powerful tool for reducing the
market power of an IP owner by enabling better substitutes. Used copies of the
original work are likely in many cases to be much better substitutes than other
works even in the same genre would be. The Tesla Roadster may be in a class
by itself, but it still faces competition from used Tesla Roadsters.
Antitrust law has long acknowledged this fact, and a number of antitrust
cases depend on the ability of fringe competitors to offer used or reconditioned
goods originally manufactured by a company that would otherwise hold unre-
246. Id. § 1201(f)(1) (exempting circumvention done "for the sole purpose of identifying and
analyzing those elements of the program that are necessary to achieve interoperability of an indepen-
dently created computer program with other programs, and that have not previously been readily
available to the person engaging in the circumvention").
247. Cf. Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineer-
ing, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1637-38 & n.304 (2002) (arguing that individual acts of circumvention and
private tool-making incidental to such circumventions should be exempted under the DMCA but noting
that "this does not mean that an individual act of circumvention should exempt the circumventor from
liability if it results in copyright infringement"). Dan Burk has argued that using the anticircumvention
provisions to block the creation of lawful, noninfringing works is a form of misuse. Dan L. Burk,
Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REv. 1095 (2003).
248. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006).
249. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 128-30 (1947); see also Nitro Leisure
Prods., L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
250. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 628-29 (2008).
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strained market power.25 1 That is true even if the goods are protected by IP
rights because all IP doctrines have some sort of first-sale or exhaustion
principle limiting control of resales.
The first-sale doctrine, however, is under sustained attack in each area of law.
In copyright, that is in part a function of the Internet; the principle that one
owns a particular copy and can pass it along to others is harder to apply when
virtually anything one does involves the making of new copies.2 52 But in larger
part, it results from the growth of shrinkwrap, clickwrap, and browsewrap
licenses and judicial deference to those "contracts."2 5 3 IP owners have increas-
ingly sought either to prevent the resale of their goods altogether or to condition
the price at which those goods can be resold.254
Trademark courts, too, are nearly always equivocal about this "right" to resell
branded products in that they universally express that right as subject to the
requirement that the use not cause confusion.25 5 And the Ninth Circuit has even
held that the first-sale doctrine can be trumped by initial interest confusion, at
least where the defendant sells a product into which the trademark is incorpo-
rated, as opposed to cases where the branded product itself is resold without
modification.2 56
The first-sale doctrine provides an important limitation on the power an IP
right confers. Efforts to undermine the doctrine threaten to confer substantial
additional market power on IP owners by constraining the closest source of
substitutes. Giving IP owners that power might conceivably make sense if we
had reason to think IP rights today were significantly weaker than they should
251. Cf United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (excluding
secondary aluminum from the market for virgin aluminum). The leading antitrust treatise says this
result "rests on doubtful premises" and explains that once Alcoa has sold virgin aluminum, it loses
control over what buyers do with the aluminum, so it may face competition from that aluminum in a
secondary sale. 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 107, 1 573a.
252. See Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L.
REv. 547 (1997); Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Copyright Exhaustion and the Personal Use
Dilemma, 96 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012); R. Anthony Reese, The Public Display Right: The
Copyright Act's Neglected Solution to the Controversy Over RAM "Copies," 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 83.
253. See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding customer to be a
licensee, not an owner); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (enforcing shrinkwrap
license terms). For discussion, see, for example, Nancy S. Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma, 2008
B.Y.U. L. REv. 1103; Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REv. 459 (2006).
254. See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding that violation of
a prohibition on reuse could constitute patent infringement); cf. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628
F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011) (attempting-unsuccessfully-to control resale of promotional copies of
CDs). Antitrust law, which used to make it illegal per se to set the resale price even of a good protected
by an IP right, see Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), recently
relaxed its scrutiny of such agreements, opening the door to more such efforts. See Leegin Creative
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (overruling Dr Miles and applying the rule of
reason to vertical price restraints).
255. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 130 (1947); Au-Tomotive Gold Inc. v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2006); Nitro Leisure Prods. L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co.,
341 F.3d 1356, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
256. Au-tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1076.
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be. But there is no such consensus, and we find it troubling that IP owners can
decide for themselves that the law should give them significant additional power
merely by rewriting a standard-form contract to which everyone "agrees"
without reading merely by visiting a web site.
Similarly, if the goal is to reduce differentiation, we should want few
limitations on parties' ability to resell (or to rent or otherwise recirculate) both
patented and branded goods. For it will often be the case, in our view, that
second-hand or used goods will be better substitutes for branded goods than
functionally interchangeable goods sold under other brands. Indeed, to the
extent the differentiation is a function of brand meaning, resold goods will
naturally and legitimately share in that meaning.
CONCLUSION
Courts in a variety of IP contexts engage more or less explicitly in market
definition as a predicate to some doctrinal determination. They do this, however,
without any apparent methodology, which has the pernicious effect of making
market definition simply a tool for reaching desired results. Antitrust law has a
well-developed methodology for defining markets, but, as we argued, that
methodology does not work well in the context of IP goods. Specifically,
antitrust's traditional approach is based on a classical conception of competition
in which parties sell largely undifferentiated goods and compete only on price
or quality. IP goods, however, differ precisely because they are differentiated;
indeed, that is largely the point of IP rights-to enable owners to prevent others
from copying too closely so that the IP owners can reap a profit sufficient to
provide incentives to invent or distribute (or, in the case of trademarks, to
enable consumers to differentiate between goods of different source).
Traditional market definition is too rigid to accommodate this reality because
it asks whether particular goods are in or out of the market rather than focusing,
as we would, on the closeness of available substitutes, taking into account the
inevitability of some differentiation. In other words, in a market full of imper-
fect substitutes, it makes more sense to ask just how imperfect the substitutes
are. To the extent we want to reduce IP owners' market power, there are
doctrinal levers within IP that can be used to enable more and better substitutes.
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